Regular meetings between senior leaders from North Korea and China, including Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to the North in seven years, are leading to the modernization of the two countries’ alliance, South Korean analysts say.

That’s the argument made in a report titled “Modernization of the North Korea-China Alliance,” published by South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy on Monday.

The report, composed by INSS Director Kim Sung-bae and research fellow Yoo Hyun-jung, argues that the Pyongyang-Beijing relationship is developing into a comprehensive, regional, horizontal and values-based alliance in response to the US-initiated modernization of the ROK-US alliance. The researchers said this shift in the Pyongyang-Beijing relationship presents a serious challenge to South Korea’s national security.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi and appointed the Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as his replacement late on July 21.

Russian authorities continue costly efforts to mitigate the loss of Russian oil refining capacity due to Ukrainian long-range strikes by subsidizing diesel imports.

The Russian government continues exerting legal pressure on Russian migrants likely to coerce migrants into military service under threat of deportation.

Polish authorities continue warning of a possible Russian provocation against NATO’s eastern flank.

Ukrainian forces struck Russian manufacturing infrastructure and military assets overnight on July 20 and 21. Russia launched 58 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction and in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Key Takeaways

The Houthis likely decided to impose their blockade on Saudi Arabia to advance their own interests, though Iran probably encouraged them to impose the blockade for Tehran’s own purposes. The Houthis have repeatedly warned Saudi-owned ships against transiting the Red Sea via radio on July 20 and July 21.

The Houthis only threatened shipping in the Red Sea once it benefited Houthi objectives. The Houthis did not adhere to earlier Iranian calls in July to close the Bab al Mandeb Strait during the recent conflict and only decided to impose a blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20 following Saudi strikes on Sanaa International Airport on July 13.

Iran continues to use force to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz and compel vessels to follow Iranian transit restrictions. Iran rejects any alternative to its designated traffic separation scheme, particularly the southern Omani route, because it allows vessels to bypass Iranian authorization and directly undermines Iran’s claim to control maritime traffic through the strait.

Iran is repeatedly attacking US bases and personnel across the region in order to erode US willingness to challenge Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely calculates that sustained attacks and rising US casualties will generate domestic pressure on the United States to end the conflict, force the United States to surrender, and accept Iranian control over the strait.

Iran is attacking critical infrastructure in Kuwait to impose direct civilian and economic costs on states that host US forces and pressure them to curtail US military operations. Iran likely calculates that sustained disruptions to electricity and water supplies will increase domestic pressure on Kuwait to restrict US operations from Kuwaiti territory.

Key Takeaways

The Houthis’ announced naval blockade against Saudi Arabia could result in an expansion of the shipping crisis in the Middle East, as it will almost certainly increase the cost of shipping through the Red Sea by discouraging ships from transiting through the Red Sea. ISW-CTP has not recorded any Houthi attacks on shipping since July 7, 2025, at the time of this writing, but the Houthis ordered Saudi-bound vessels to turn back from Saudi Arabia over radio on July 20.

Iran is trying to expand the geographical scope of its conflict with the United States to the Red Sea to cause further disruption to international markets and impose additional costs on the United States. The Houthis may have announced the blockade to deter Saudi Arabia from striking Houthi targets in Yemen to discourage further Saudi attacks, separate from but partially satisfying Iranian efforts to impose costs on the United States.

Some senior Iranian officials appear concerned that the renewed conflict will deepen Iran’s economic problems and threaten Iran’s internal security. Senior Iranian officials have previously appeared concerned that the conflict will deepen Iran’s economic problems, but these concerns do not appear to have meaningfully impacted the calculus of the IRGC.

US forces expanded strikes to possible missile launch sites in northwestern and central Iran. Iran continues to coerce vessels by force to transit through Iranian territorial waters to prevent them from using routes through the strait that Tehran does not approve. Iran has attacked at least two vessels in the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.

The IRGC released a statement on July 19 thanking the Jordanian people for providing Iran with information that has aided Iran’s recent attacks on Jordan, possibly to counter continuing reports that Russia and the People’s Republic of China have helped Iran target US assets in the region during the US-Israel-Iran War. The statement could also be part of recent broader Iranian efforts to mobilize the local populations in Arab countries against US forces.

Key Takeaways

Russian milbloggers rebutted Russian official statements that Russian forces have secured the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway — the primary land route connecting mainland Russia to occupied Crimea against Ukrainian mid-range drone strikes.

Russia’s continued long-range strike campaign against cities across Ukraine reportedly contributed to record-high civilian casualties in the war in June 2026.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and air defense systems on July 19 and 20.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 20.

Russia launched two Kh-59/69 guided missiles and 94 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Nuclear reactor exports are becoming an increasingly important arena of strategic competition.

Executive Summary:

Under Lai Ching-te, Taiwan has significantly strengthened its countermeasures against political warfare from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Prosecutions of espionage cases, expulsions of influencers calling for military invasions of Taiwan, and tighter outbound travel restrictions to the PRC have increased since Lai unveiled his 17-point national security plan in 2025.

Espionage is the most damaging aspect of the PRC’s political warfare against Taiwan, and Beijing has been targeting members of its military. Taiwan has stepped up prosecutions, with convicted spies handed heavy prison sentences.

Taiwan is choosing to respond to political warfare because, unlike military coercion, there is a lower risk of conflict escalation arising from more aggressive law enforcement efforts. The enforcement actions are also consistent with Taiwanese law.

A Czech citizen was detained in China, raising concerns of diplomatic pressures over espionage case

Key Takeaways

Russian forces are resuming their strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure along the Black Sea coast.

The Russian strikes likely aim to degrade the Ukrainian economy and reduce Ukraine’s export capacity.

The Russian strikes are likely also a response to Ukraine’s recent strike campaign against Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, but such Russian strike tactics are not new.

Russia appears to be struggling to deliver its rising seaborne crude oil exports as Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign is reducing Russia’s refining capacity.

Polish and Baltic officials continue to report that Russia may be planning a false flag attack against NATO.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov confirmed on July 15 that he is stepping down from his position.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Russia on July 12. Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 122 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Executive Summary:

Russia and Taliban-led Afghanistan signed a military cooperation agreement on May 27 in Moscow, one year after the Kremlin removed the Taliban from its list of banned terrorist organizations and became the first and only country to recognize the Taliban government.

The undisclosed pact—framed by Moscow as covering the repair of Russian-made equipment—signals a broader strategy to integrate Afghanistan into Russia’s sphere of influence as a transit hub linking Central Asia to the Indian Ocean.

Deepening Russian–Taliban ties risk unsettling Pakistan, which is engaged in open conflict with the Taliban regime, alarming Central Asian states such as Tajikistan, and undermining the position of the People’s Republic of China, Afghanistan’s largest foreign investor.

Key Takeaways

The United States has continued to strike Iranian military targets, including some targets further inland. Iranian regime media reported on July 15 that US forces struck the Artesh Ground Forces 388th Mechanized Assault Brigade barracks in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province. This strike is notable given that the 388th Brigade is located around 200 kilometers from the Iranian coast, while most US airstrikes in July have been concentrated around Iran’s southern coast. The Artesh has conducted operations throughout the war and most recently claimed on July 15 that it conducted drone strikes targeting US forces at Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Azraq, Jordan.

Iraqi media reported on July 15 that an unknown actor launched six drones targeting Erbil International Airport and the US Consulate in Erbil, Erbil Province. It is unclear whether Iran or Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted this attack.

Iran is attacking vessels that have adopted alternative mechanisms to bypass Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran attacked three vessels in the strait on July 13, two of which were doing “shuttle runs,” or repeated short trips to ports outside the strait in order to transport oil through the strait while avoiding Iranian territorial waters.

Iran’s attacks on shipping are having some success in deterring shipping companies from using routes outside Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme, which advances Iran’s objective of securing control over the strait. Seven maritime security and shipping industry sources told Reuters on July 15 that shipping companies are avoiding using the southern route despite US military escorts, highlighting how shipping companies’ willingness to use alternative routes in the strait is dependent on their risk calculations.