Key Takeaways

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi and appointed the Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as his replacement late on July 21.

Russian authorities continue costly efforts to mitigate the loss of Russian oil refining capacity due to Ukrainian long-range strikes by subsidizing diesel imports.

The Russian government continues exerting legal pressure on Russian migrants likely to coerce migrants into military service under threat of deportation.

Polish authorities continue warning of a possible Russian provocation against NATO’s eastern flank.

Ukrainian forces struck Russian manufacturing infrastructure and military assets overnight on July 20 and 21. Russia launched 58 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction and in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Regular meetings between senior leaders from North Korea and China, including Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to the North in seven years, are leading to the modernization of the two countries’ alliance, South Korean analysts say.

That’s the argument made in a report titled “Modernization of the North Korea-China Alliance,” published by South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy on Monday.

The report, composed by INSS Director Kim Sung-bae and research fellow Yoo Hyun-jung, argues that the Pyongyang-Beijing relationship is developing into a comprehensive, regional, horizontal and values-based alliance in response to the US-initiated modernization of the ROK-US alliance. The researchers said this shift in the Pyongyang-Beijing relationship presents a serious challenge to South Korea’s national security.

Key Takeaways

The Houthis likely decided to impose their blockade on Saudi Arabia to advance their own interests, though Iran probably encouraged them to impose the blockade for Tehran’s own purposes. The Houthis have repeatedly warned Saudi-owned ships against transiting the Red Sea via radio on July 20 and July 21.

The Houthis only threatened shipping in the Red Sea once it benefited Houthi objectives. The Houthis did not adhere to earlier Iranian calls in July to close the Bab al Mandeb Strait during the recent conflict and only decided to impose a blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20 following Saudi strikes on Sanaa International Airport on July 13.

Iran continues to use force to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz and compel vessels to follow Iranian transit restrictions. Iran rejects any alternative to its designated traffic separation scheme, particularly the southern Omani route, because it allows vessels to bypass Iranian authorization and directly undermines Iran’s claim to control maritime traffic through the strait.

Iran is repeatedly attacking US bases and personnel across the region in order to erode US willingness to challenge Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely calculates that sustained attacks and rising US casualties will generate domestic pressure on the United States to end the conflict, force the United States to surrender, and accept Iranian control over the strait.

Iran is attacking critical infrastructure in Kuwait to impose direct civilian and economic costs on states that host US forces and pressure them to curtail US military operations. Iran likely calculates that sustained disruptions to electricity and water supplies will increase domestic pressure on Kuwait to restrict US operations from Kuwaiti territory.