Submission statement: CIA operative Jonny Gannon was tasked with assessing the trustworthiness of Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE’s national security adviser, regarding his plans to build a major AI hub. Despite concerns about G42’s ties to China and potential technology theft, Gannon’s efforts led to the UAE gaining access to advanced AI chips, with the Biden administration later easing restrictions on G42’s access to U.S. technology. This decision sparked debate within the U.S. national security community, highlighting the complexities of balancing security concerns with strategic partnerships in the AI era.

paywall: https://archive.ph/LkPzM

Re: Denis Obrezko, the Russian national arrested in Thailand in November 2025, who allegedly worked for the FSB in 2012-2017 and in 2024 became deputy director at the IT company Yutek-NN that U.S. prosecutors believe is involved in the Void Blizzard cyber espionage campaign. Obrezko is now reported to have worked at Kaspersky in 2017-2019, demonstrating "the thin lines between the cybersecurity industry and government spies".

'[...] On the fentanyl brokers, the CSE said it collected foreign intelligence on the criminals involved and then conducted an active cyberoperation – disruptive hacking – against them that the agency says, “disrupted and diminished their ability to operate.” The CSE says it also supported law enforcement as part of the effort. [...] It is the first time the CSE has publicly described a completed offensive cyberoperation targeting the fentanyl supply chain in its annual report. [...]'

Given Mojtaba Khamenei‘s recent threats against US officials, and the relatively sudden and unexpected nature of Graham’s death, what is the probability that it was the result of some pharmacological assassination? Graham was a 71-year-old so a heart attack from natural causes is completely plausible, and one would hope a high profile US Senator would have the security needed to protect against foreign actors. But the circumstances are suspicious. Thoughts from folks?

This is the first in a series of brief articles on the Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) intelligence and political failure to help, not just the intelligence officers involved but also the general public, identify exactly what went wrong. This information will hopefully assist them to avoid or at least mitigate future failures; if, of course, they are willing to learn from their mistakes. To fully understand the root causes of this intelligence failure, we only need to examine the CURVE BALL case as an excellent example of what can go seriously and disastrously wrong in the collection, analysis, management, and leadership of intelligence, especially when it is allowed to be influenced by politics. The full detailed story, hopefully left unreacted by the CIA and DIA during its mandatory review, will be presented in my forthcoming book, Absence of Evidence; The Incredible Story of the Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure from Inside the American, British, and German intelligence services.

The CURVE BALL Case

In 2003, the United States Government, supported by a coalition of allied military forces, engaged in a preemptive invasion of Iraq to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein based on the alleged threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The most important and significant intelligence source for this WMD justification was an Iraqi engineer ironically codenamed “CURVE BALL” who claimed that Iraq had a secret project to produce biological warfare (BW) agents in mobile plants mounted on semi- truck trailers and railcars. Unilaterally handled by the German Federal Intelligence Service, officially known as the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), CURVE BALL’s “unverified” reporting was shared with both the American Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) beginning in early 2000.

Eventually over one hundred intelligence reports would be disseminated by the DIA’s intelligence collection arm, the Defense HUMINT Service, based on the BND’s debriefings of CURVE BALL from January 2000 to January 2003. This was done, unfortunately, with little or no vetting as to the veracity of the claims or the credibility of the source. This compartmented material was supplemented by additional intelligence from the SIS and some clarifying reporting disseminated by the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. Misinterpreted intelligence reporting from other allegedly “corroborating” sources only increased these intelligence services confidence in CURVE BALL’s sensational claims. This intelligence reporting together formed the cornerstone of the U.S. and foreign Intelligence Community’s flawed judgment on the existence and status of an alleged Iraqi offensive BW program. Making the situation worse, this alarming reporting also influenced intelligence assessments on other alleged Iraq WMD programs—chemical weapons (CW) development efforts specifically but those on potential delivery systems as well—by encouraging the other CIA analysts to assume that clandestine Iraqi efforts on these technologies must exist as well. Coupled with the CIA’s ongoing promotion of its senior nuclear analysts’ concocted theory of the intent behind the Iraqi purchase of “aluminum tubes for centrifuges” and the alleged “uranium from Africa” based on obviously forged documents, CURVE BALL’s claims of mobile BW agent production plants that were used in CIA’s finished intelligence products were “well-received” by a George W. Bush White House desperate for intelligence that painted Saddam Hussein as an “imminent threat.” By late 2002, the stage was now set for one of the worst major intelligence and political failures in the history of the United States.

Besides being used in numerous intelligence assessments and Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) articles—the most important and sensitive finished intelligence produced by the CIA—CURVE BALL’s suspect claims were also included in the U.S. Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. However, the most significant use of CURVE BALL’s flawed intelligence was as the centerpiece of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s policy speech to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on February 5, 2003 that was broadcast not only in the U.S. but also to the rest of the world.

At the time it was presented, Powell’s speech regarding this alleged WMD threat from Saddam Hussein was considered a tremendous achievement by the CIA leadership and senior analytical management, despite the fact that it clearly crossed the line into promoting policy. CURVE BALL’s reporting, along with the associated “slick” CIA graphics of the alleged mobile BW plants, appeared to have won over almost everyone who had previously questioned the need for a U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq. In fact, it was the only intelligence in the entire speech that was reportedly based on a credible HUMINT (HUMan INTelligence) source with direct knowledge of WMD in Iraq. In other words, an “eyewitness” to the fact that WMD was again being produced by Saddam Hussein’s regime. After suffering from years of irrelevance and lack of access to the policymaking process during the preceding Clinton administration, the CIA’s leadership believed the Agency was once again playing a direct and invaluable role to its “First Customer,” President Bush, by providing the intelligence justification for his pre- established policy of “regime change” in Iraq.

The UN speech was considered a tremendous success by the Bush White House and had the political impact that the Bush Administration desperately wanted to achieve. Of course, this was primarily due to the unrivaled respect that most people had for Secretary Powell, known for his “doctrine” that the U.S. needed to exhaust all “political, economic, and diplomatic means”, and only if all were futile, would necessitate the nation resorting to military force. Dismissing this doctrine and proceeding recklessly, the White House even suggested that by installing a new Iraq government, the seeds of democracy might be planted in the Middle East that could spread to other countries in the region.

With Powell’s speech, the White House and CIA were also able to convince most of the U.S. Congress, public, and press, as well as the intelligence services, politicians, and press of our foreign allies, that Saddam Hussein “has” WMD (CIA leadership was instructed by senior White House officials to pressure analysts to move beyond what the current intelligence would support). Based on that manipulated finished intelligence and ignoring the Powell doctrine, those same White House officials could now state publicly that the Iraqi dictator was a “grave and gathering threat” who had to be immediately dealt with using military force. CURVE BALL’s claim of an alleged TOP SECRET Iraqi program to design, build, and operate mobile BW production plants was, without any doubt, the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Iraq WMD “smoking gun” and the prelude to yet another Gulf war, but there was only one problem with this intelligence...

...it was completely false.

Worse, the CIA leadership, senior management, and analysts had been warned that it was unreliable but they used the unverified intelligence anyway. Despite this outward appearance of confidence by the CIA, DIA, SIS, and BND with CURVE BALL, there were serious internal problems with this source that had surfaced years before start of the March 2003 war that would not become widely known outside of these intelligence services, even by congressional oversight committees, a presidentially appointed commission, and foreign government investigations until months and even years after the war had ended. Some of the source’s more blatant and egregious credibility problems remain hidden to this day, shielded from public disclosure through the abuse of the CIA and DIA’s classification authority.

Before this UNSC meeting, CIA operations officers had redacted CURVE BALL’s suspect intelligence reporting from copies of Powell’s speech that were sent to them, but it was always put back in by the Agency’s seventh floor leadership. Powell himself, along with other senior State Department officials including deputy Richard Armitage, and Chief of Staff Larry Wilkerson, came to the CIA Headquarters to personally vet the intelligence claims, not realizing that they were being deliberated misled. Powell personally questioned the analysts and managers regarding the credibility of the intelligence without realizing that the naysayers in CIA—operations officers who would not have hesitated in identifying serious credibility problems with the intelligence—were not present in the meetings. Their absence and the lack of acknowledgement of this fact was not an oversight by the CIA leadership and senior management, it was deliberate action to avoid angering the White House by undermining the WMD judgments at a crucial time in the rush to war.

At one point in the discussions, Powell directly questioned the CIA director, George Tenet and his deputy director, John McLauglin, about the credibility of CURVE BALL’s intelligence reporting and was told, “It’s solid.” Given that Powell was about to put his political credibility and reputation on the line to present the CIA's intelligence case in a public speech, he had every right to attempt to vet the claims on which it was based. Not having direct access to the contradictory and derogatory intelligence or even access to those CIA operations officers who had aggressively challenged CIA’s assessments, Powell and his staff were at a complete disadvantage. In other words, they were being played by the CIA leadership and management who were deliberately controlling and manipulating the intelligence. This untenable situation would later come back to haunt all of them, especially Powell, when the CIA leadership later let him take the majority of the blame for the flawed intelligence that the Agency had provided.

Interestingly, as the February 5, 2003 date of the UN speech approached and contrary to the strong confidence they displayed to Powell and others in the Bush administration, the CIA leadership privately remained extremely concerned that CURVE BALL could undermine his own intelligence claims if he were allowed the freedom to speak to the press. To prevent this, DDCI McLaughlin instructed CIA stations and bases in Europe to make certain that the BND maintained tight control of their source. On February 3, 2003, the day after Powell’s last visit to CIA in a futile attempt to vet the speech, the DDCI’s executive assistant sent a memorandum entitled, “German BW Source,” to Tyler Drumheller, the EUR Division Chief who had been one of those operations officers aggressively trying to warn the CIA leadership not to rely on CURVE BALL’s intelligence.

Shockingly, the memorandum, quoted in the WMD Commission’s March 2005 final report, stated: “[pseudonym of EUR Division chief], this will confirm the DDCI’s informal request to touch base w/the German stations once more on the current status/ whereabouts of the emigre [CURVE BALL] who reported on the mobile BW plants. A great deal of effort is being expended to vet the intelligence that underlies SecState’s upcoming UN presentation. Similarly, we want to make every precaution against unwelcome surprise that might emerge concerning the intel case; clearly, public statements by this émigré, press accounts of his reporting or credibility, or even direct press access to him would cause a number of potential concerns. The DDCI would be grateful for the [Berlin chief of station’s] view on the immediate ‘days-after’ reaction in Germany surrounding the source of this key BW reporting.”

This document, probably more than any others, conclusively proved that the CIA leadership was well aware of serious credibility problems with CURVE BALL and the veracity of his reporting. After manipulating the intelligence for the White House, they now wanted to control the source of those claims to avoid the political embarrassment should he suddenly admit that he was fabricating. They were very concerned that immediately after Powell presented his UN speech, CURVE BALL could come out and publicly recant everything he said about the alleged mobile BW plants; possibly even accepting financial incentives for telling the truth and admitting that it was all just a lie to get German citizenship for himself and his family. This would be an enormous political disaster for the CIA leadership and for the Bush administration if that were to occur and McLaughlin knew very well what the consequences would be for both. Therefore, the DDCI wanted to make absolutely certain that the BND had CURVE BALL fully under control to prevent this suspect intelligence source from talking to anyone, especially the press.

Although most officials in the U.S. and foreign intelligence services came to the same flawed judgment regarding CURVE BALL for reasons that will be explained in my book, Absence of Evidence, the CIA’s biased analysts, and politically-motivated managers, and leadership—more than any other intelligence agency’s personnel—put far more faith in the sensational claims of this unvetted source than others, refused to seriously question the credibility of the source or the veracity of this reporting even when warned. Most significant, they did not allow any others inside or outside of the CIA to challenge his story, including their own operations officers who provided contradictory and derogatory intelligence against CURVE BALL. Worse, despite knowing that serious doubts and concerns existed in the U.S. and allied foreign intelligence services regarding CURVE BALL’s sensational claims, the CIA promoted and defended this intelligence against any and all challengers. This allowed the Bush White House to use it politically to justify its pre-established policy of regime change in Iraq (rather than to help formulate policy as intended) and aggressively drive the alleged Iraq WMD issue to its disastrous and inevitable tragic conclusion.

Had the CIA and DIA not failed catastrophically to assess the actual status of WMD programs in Iraq; namely that these programs simply did not exist after 1991, that the regime was contained by UN inspections and sanctions, and that Saddam was not the “grave and gathering threat” he was assessed to be, the result would not have been a major historical disaster for the U.S. and its allies.

...So what went wrong?

Topics could include: * How the DSA affects online platforms. * How to prepare clear, evidence-based reports about suspected scams or fraud. * How official appeal and transparency mechanisms work. * Best practices for documenting evidence before submitting a report. * Common mistakes that reduce the effectiveness of reports. Would you read a complete guide covering these topics? Share your thoughts below.

submission statement: U.S. satellite imagery restrictions have hindered reporting on the Iran war, with five providers blocking high-resolution images of Iran and surrounding countries. These restrictions, rooted in national security concerns, have been a challenge for journalists, but alternative sources like international satellite providers and public data offer workarounds. Despite these limitations, satellite imagery remains a crucial tool for uncovering military actions and potential war crimes.