The Trump administration is weighing military action in the West African country of Mali to target an al-Qaeda-affiliated group known as JNIM, said current and former U.S. officials familiar with the deliberations.

If approved, it would add an eighth nation to the list of countries where President Donald Trump has ordered strikes since the start of his second term — a chapter of his presidency that he initially said would be dedicated to ending global strife and redirecting U.S. resources to Americans.

There is disagreement, however, among senior U.S. officials over whether to proceed with attacking the militant group. A vocal advocate for using force is the National Security Council’s senior director for counterterrorism, Sebastian Gorka, said the current and former officials, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss military planning.

The militant group, whose full name is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, has established a stronghold in Mali and increasingly launched attacks in coastal West African nations, establishing itself as the most well-armed militant group in the region and among the most powerful in the world.

The Pentagon declined to comment.

When the White House was asked for comment, an administration official would not disclose whether the president intended to move forward with military strikes but said the United States has been urging governments in North and West Africa “to purchase U.S. equipment and services to support their war efforts against the terrorists.”

The official said that terrorism in the Sahel, the vast semiarid region south of the Sahara, is a “multinational problem.”

“We urge regional partners and NATO allies to support the Alliance of Sahel States in their war against JNIM and ISIS,” the official added, referring also to the Islamic State, which rose to prominence in the Middle East before establishing affiliates throughout Africa.

The Alliance of Sahel States consists of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger — all West African nations where military leaders have in recent years ousted democratically elected governments in coups, largely cut ties with the West and turned to Russia for security help.

But the administration official pinned the blame not on those governments but on their Russian partners, saying that Moscow “has proven to be an ineffective security partner for Mali.”

“We hope that other African nations take note of Russia’s terrible performance in combating terrorism,” the official said.

The Trump administration’s contemplation of military options in the country has not been previously reported.

Mali, a landlocked nation of nearly 25 million, has in recent years been plagued by violence by Islamist militant groups — and by Mali’s own junta government and the Russian mercenaries whom it hired to get the situation under control.

The militant groups, particularly JNIM, have grown increasingly powerful, turning Mali and its neighbors in the Sahel into the world’s center for terrorism.

Last year, militants with the al-Qaeda affiliate mounted a fuel blockade that paralyzed much of the country. This spring, they launched coordinated, nationwide attacks that included militants roaming the streets of Bamako, the capital; seizing a strategic city in the north from Mali’s military and the Russians; and killing the country’s defense minister in a suicide attack.

Meanwhile, IS Sahel — an Islamic State affiliate and a JNIM rival — has consolidated power near Mali’s border with Niger, where last year its militants kidnapped American missionary Kevin Rideout, who is believed to be held now in Mali.

To combat the violence, Mali’s junta government hired Russian mercenaries, first with the Wagner Group and now with Africa Corps, which is more closely linked with Russia’s defense ministry. The Russians have been accused of a string of atrocities, according to rights groups and The Washington Post’s previous reporting.

Héni Nsaibia, West Africa senior analyst for the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project, said that Mali’s military and its Russian backers were responsible for killing hundreds more civilians than JNIM and IS Sahel combined. Last year, the Malian military and its Russian partners were responsible for 925 civilian deaths, according to ACLED, compared with 232 by Islamist militants.

“It is extremely problematic that a government like the U.S. or any Western partner would provide support to these regimes whose legitimacy remains contested, and which are incredibly fragile and repressive,” he said, referring to Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

Still, last year, as part of a push by the Trump administration to reengage with Mali, the United States ramped up intelligence sharing with Mali’s government, current and former American officials said at the time. The intelligence was used in strikes by Mali’s military, which had been largely shunned by the Biden administration for its refusal to set a timeline for a return to democratic elections and its work with the Russians.

But such cooperation has so far remained limited, nowhere near the scale of the U.S.-Nigeria security partnership that ramped up last year and has included U.S. airstrikes and a ground mission that killed one of the Islamic State’s top leaders in Africa.

Any direct U.S. military involvement in Mali runs the risk of hostilities with Russian forces in the region. It also could require deconfliction efforts between Washington and Moscow akin to ones that existed in Syria during that country’s civil war.

When asked if Secretary of State Marco Rubio supports military action in Mali, the State Department sidestepped the question, saying the U.S. “unequivocally condemns the terrorist activity in Mali.”

The department said the Trump administration is “committed to promoting regional ownership and cooperation against terrorist threats, and monitoring indicators and warnings of threats to our homeland.”

U.S. military action against JNIM would add Mali to the list of countries where Trump has ordered strikes: Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela. The administration also has waged a controversial military campaign against alleged drug runners in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific that has resulted in scores of deaths.

Wassim Nasr, a Sahel specialist and senior research fellow at the Soufan Center, said that the U.S. could be most useful by getting involved instead in “conflict resolution,” forcing Mali’s junta government to talk with JNIM, which has focused not on global aims but on applying Islamic laws in local governance, and other political opponents whom the junta has largely silenced.

“Opting for the military solution one more time won’t get things resolved,” Nasr said. “The French tried that for 10 years. The Russians have been trying for five years. The situation has only gotten worse and worse.”

France launched its military intervention in the Sahel in 2013 at the request of Mali’s then-government. French forces quashed the insurgency in Mali and restored a measure of order. That initial mission was followed by a second, Operation Barkhane, that eliminated prominent militant leaders but ultimately failed to stop the spread of various armed groups.

Anger at France — fueled by its neocolonial missteps and by Russian disinformation — grew over the years, helping propel coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021 and in neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger. President Emmanuel Macron later withdrew French forces.

Nasr added that if U.S. strikes weaken JNIM, they conversely could help IS Sahel, whose growth has been limited by the rival al-Qaeda-affiliated group.

Peter Pham, a former Trump administration official, was less pessimistic about the use of military force but said a precondition should be reestablishing trust with the governments of Mali and Niger ahead of security cooperation efforts.

“While we may have very limited direct economic or other interests in these countries, we do not want jihadists like ISIS and al-Qaeda gaining a foothold there,” Pham said.

Gorka has long made aggressive counterterrorism policies a cornerstone of his ideology. But his impact on policy since the start of Trump’s second term has been modest, said a U.S. official — a source of relief for his critics, who object to his hard-line approach, and a disappointment to his supporters.

In the spring, Gorka engaged in conversations about becoming Trump’s next director of the National Counterterrorism Center following the resignation of Joe Kent, who left the administration embittered by the president’s decision to start the war in Iran. But those discussions have not materialized into a nomination for Gorka.

Current and former U.S. officials said that Gorka had been deeply involved with talks about how to bring home Rideout, the captured missionary. One key aim of the administration last year was to get “overflight” rights in Mali, a former official said, so that U.S. officials could fly airplanes and other surveillance technology over Malian skies to better track his movements.

That desire for overflight rights was behind the administration’s decision to lift sanctions on key junta members, including Defense Minister Sadio Camara, who was a key proponent of Russian intervention in Mali and was killed in the JNIM attack on April 25.

Gorka, current and former officials say, also was invested in an effort to kill Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, a leader in an Algeria-based al-Qaeda affiliate that has seen its influence wane in recent years. Although American officials were hopeful last summer that U.S. intelligence had been used in a Malian strike to take out al-Anabi, as The Post previously reported, his death was never confirmed.

Corinne Dufka, an independent expert on the Sahel, said that there is a risk that any U.S. strikes could lead JNIM to target the U.S. or Americans in the region — which it has not done so far — or to push the group closer to the main al-Qaeda organization, from which it has grown more autonomous in recent years.

“If the U.S. helps Malian authorities kill JNIM authorities, it could backfire,” she said. “And they could be squandering an opportunity to de-radicalize and demobilize one of the world’s most sophisticated jihadist organizations.”

How do futile bombing campaigns fit into the theory of war?

Russia's Finance Ministry has suspended federal government bond auctions indefinitely as borrowing costs climb and investor demand weakens, complicating efforts to finance a widening wartime budget deficit.

The ministry said on Monday it was halting its regular weekly auctions of government bonds, known as OFZs, "to facilitate the stabilization of market conditions." It did not say when sales would resume, saying only that it would announce their restart at a later date.

OFZs are ruble-denominated government bonds that underpin Russia's financial system. They are the government's primary source of domestic borrowing to cover budget deficits, while banks hold them to manage daily cash needs and foreign investors buy them for returns.

The Finance Ministry has relied heavily on domestic borrowing to help finance a budget deficit that reached 5.7 trillion rubles ($72.39 billion) at the end of June, while military spending continues to outpace initial government plans.

Prices of OFZs have fallen sharply since mid-June. The RGBI government bond index has dropped from around 119 points to about 110, its lowest level this year, while yields on bonds with maturities longer than 10 years have climbed above 16.5%.

The ministry's last four scheduled auctions were either canceled or attracted little demand. It canceled the June 24 auction, sold only 10.3 billion rubles ($130.81 million) of a planned 110 billion rubles ($1.40 billion) on July 1, canceled another auction on July 8 and, on July 15, scrapped the sale after receiving no bids at what it considered acceptable prices.

The Finance Ministry had planned to raise 1.5 trillion rubles ($19.05 billion) on the domestic debt market during the third quarter. So far, however, it has borrowed just 8.8 billion rubles ($111.76 million) in net proceeds during the quarter, according to Vector Capital analysts.

Analysts said the main factors weighing on Russian government bonds were rising inflation and expectations that the Central Bank may pause its cycle of interest rate cuts.

Nikolai Leonenkov, director of corporate finance at investment company Rikom-Trust, said inflation and expectations for monetary policy had been the main drivers behind the bond market's decline.

Investors are also concerned that a larger federal budget deficit could require increased government borrowing and additional bond issuance, said Pavel Payevsky, head of credit analysis and macroeconomics at asset manager RSHB Asset Management.

According to Bloomberg, the Finance Ministry plans to raise an additional 2-3 trillion rubles ($25.40 billion-$38.10 billion) in debt this year to help cover military spending that is expected to exceed budget plans by 4-5 trillion rubles ($50.80 billion-$63.50 billion). The rest would come from cuts to civilian spending, Bloomberg reported, citing people familiar with the matter.

Alexander Kolyandr, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), said the ministry was unwilling to borrow at current market rates.

"Yields have jumped. In other words, the interest rate at which banks are willing to lend to the government has risen to around 16% for 10-year debt. That's a lot," Kolyandr said. "It's a very high yield, a very high interest rate. The Finance Ministry is clearly reluctant to borrow at that rate."

No classified briefings, no press conferences, no acknowledgment that the conflict with Iran is back on

archive link

Talking about opposition to nuclear energy. Now, "destroying our civilisation" may sound hyperbolic. But I assign high probability to the scenario that the upcoming damage that will be caused by global warming will produce catastrophic harm and suffering to billions of people, severe regional state failure, mass displacement, global economic and political crisis.The poorest countries will suffer the most, of course.(When has the world ever been fair?).

We could have supplied a dominant share of global electricity, supported extensive electrification and displaced enormous quantities of coal and gas if we simply continued in the glide path towards nuclear of the last mid century. Abundance without (much) sacrifice. It would be unfair to completely dismiss nuclear waste, but that negative is miniscule, compared to all the positives that could be reaped. Nuclear waste is measurable, containable and very small in volume.

Renewables will play their part, but they are not being rolled out fast enough to offset the damage we are wreaking on our environment.Variable renewable generation requires grids, storage, demand flexibility and firm low-carbon capacity. We already have a difficult transition without contending with all these as well. Nuclear is a mature technology. We could still deploy it at scale and reasonable cost if we simply rationalise regulations and do a build out that would maximise economies of scale.

I think the Anti-Nuclears are motivated by hatred and irrational fear, mainly. Hatred of development, capitalism, growth, industrialisation, science to a smaller extent, than any real positive concerns. Irrational fear caused by ignorance and adjacence to nuclear weaponry. Their hatred may or may not be justified, and their fear is most likely not, but, in the end, it is leading to the future destruction of many lives. We are allowing people with an ideology to commit crimes against our futures. I cannot understand why the backlash is not more mainstream.

Edit:Thanking everyone for the replies. The hatred point was a bit overblown, and there are many valid critiques. My primary argument is that we are facing an existential threat. We needed to transition off fossil fuels 20 years ago. Now all alternative options must be pursued to insure a chance of survival , especially nuclear, while doubling down on renewables.

-The growth rate of renewable installed capacity is in a league that nuclear cannot hope to match, which we need to double down on. But a gw of solar installed capacity does not equal a gw of nuclear installed capacity. We need to consider the energy output, which is approximately 5 times higher per unit of nuclear installed capacity than solar installed capacity .(1.75 TWh/year for 1 gw solar compared to 8 TWh/year for installed nuclear). So nameplate expansion should be taken with a grain of salt. -

-Predicating an entire system on renewables is not proven. Since output is weather-dependent and strongly correlated across wide geographical areas, adding more installations does not proportionately increase dependable capacity. We will encounter system transitions due to correlation that need substantially more expenditures on grid overbuilding, redundant capacity, load balancing , demand management, and also managing excess production by redundancies.

-Much of nuclear’s current cost disadvantage, especially in Western countries, idue to lost expertise, fragmented supply chains, design changes and poor project management.

-Long term storage of energy across seasons is a bit difficult. You can store 1 gw production with 4 gwh storage for four hours, but physics dictates you need 96 gwh for 4 days, so you can judge cross seasonal storage.

-A purely renewable grid will be forced to maintain ccgts or other fossil generation as insurance. Almost all of our current fossil generation will be needed to insure the bigger grids of the future.

-Nuclear plants can operate for 60-80 years. We have yet to gauge the relative costs of renewables against such a long amortisation schedule for nuclear costs.

-The supply chain risks for renewables are obvious: Grades of mined copper ores have been falling for decades etc.

Nuclear and fossil fuels are in competition to be the backbone of our grid, not renewables.

Submission statement: The RN is preparing its party platform for next year's presidential election. Muslims are obviously gonna be a big target, but some members of the party (and not small ones) think this may be going too far for the median voter. Bardella had long avoided to handle the issue himself, but now that Marine is back in the race for the top job, she wants her favored policies to be top priority.

Themes of the sub: freedom of religion, far-right

IMO I hope that the party's hardline base stays home if they remove it, or vice-versa that their soft-right wing stays home if they keep it (or that they switch to another party). It'd make getting sane candidates on 2nd round slightly easier. But the median RN voter is too much into conspiracies and brainslop to really move away from the party.

Archived version: https://archive.fo/OTI7v

Russia is no longer willing to return some occupied territories to Ukraine as part of any deal to end the war and plans to retain them as buffer zones, according to people close to the Kremlin.

Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to taking full control of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region by force and will now retain areas of Sumy and Kharkiv regions near the border with Russia as buffer zones, three people said, asking not to be identified discussing sensitive issues.

Putin has abandoned territorial concessions because Russia views increasingly confrontational statements from the US as evidence that informal understandings reached at his Alaska summit with President Donald Trump have collapsed, the people said.

While the US insists no deal to end Russia’s war in Ukraine was reached at the summit last August, Kremlin officials have repeatedly asserted that a package of undertakings existed under a so-called “spirit of Anchorage” agreement between Putin and Trump. They included pressing Ukraine to surrender territory in its eastern Donetsk region in return for Russia handing back occupied areas of the northern Sumy and northeastern Kharkiv regions.

The Kremlin has hardened its position amid escalating Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia, including on Moscow, that have damaged oil refineries and sparked a nationwide fuel shortage. Trump also backed a new sanctions bill championed by the late Senator Lindsey Graham that would target the top five purchasers of Russian oil and gas with tariff rates of as much as 100%.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov didn’t respond to a request for comment.

The summit between Trump and Putin was their longest face-to-face meeting and took place amid high expectations for a breakthrough to end the war. In the end, Putin left Anchorage without agreeing to a ceasefire to allow for peace talks, while Trump said it would be up to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to make a deal.

US-led negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on a peace deal have stalled since February as the Trump administration focused on the war with Iran.

Zelenskyy challenged Putin in an open letter in June to meet for direct peace talks to end the war that’s now in its fifth year. Putin rejected that offer and said his army should “keep working.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio are attending a meeting of counterparts from the Association of South East Asian Nations in the Philippines. Rubio said Monday he’s “open” to speaking with Lavrov in Manila, though neither side has confirmed a meeting so far.

Russia has stepped up drone and missile attacks on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities in recent weeks. Intense fighting continues in the Donetsk region centered around Konstiantynivka, a strategic logistics hub whose capture by Russia would open the way toward Ukraine’s main defensive strongholds of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.

Putin wants Ukraine to surrender control of territory in Donetsk that his forces have failed to take in fighting since 2014. Ukraine rejects that demand and has proposed a halt to the war along the existing front lines.

Russia is prepared to return to negotiations only after Putin has achieved the objective of taking Donetsk, according to two of the people close to the Kremlin. Russia’s Defense Ministry has assured the president it can establish full control of the area by the end of the year, one person said.

Many in Russia’s military consider that timetable unrealistic and believe that it will only be able to take control of Donetsk region during 2027, according to a person close to the Defense Ministry in Moscow.

Rubio told reporters June 25 that “there was a proposal in Alaska, but there was no agreement in Alaska” on a deal to end the war. “If there had been an agreement, we would have had an end to the war,” he said.

Lavrov said in a statement next day that Putin had responded in Alaska to proposals previously brought to Moscow by Trump envoy Steve Witkoff.

“If one party, in this case the United States, puts forward its proposals for a settlement — for an approach to resolving this crisis — and the other party expresses concurrence with these proposals, then to state that no agreement was reached appears, to put it mildly, somewhat inelegant,” Lavrov said.

Original text: https://archive.fo/7dVw3

Thorsten Frei, a close associate of the Chancellor, is set to become the new leader of the Union parliamentary group. He has previously been involved in many of the government's mistakes.

So, the choice has fallen on the solution that was both obvious and—from the perspective of Chancellor Friedrich Merz—presumably the safest: Thorsten Frei—52, Catholic, and a father of three from Baden-Württemberg—is set to become the new parliamentary group leader of the CDU/CSU, succeeding Jens Spahn.

Reportedly, this was the position Frei had most wanted from the start of the Black-Red government. His second choice, it was said, would have been Interior Minister. He had to deal with the Chancellor first—working in the Chancellery, where the two share the same floor. Merz tends to surround himself with people he trusts and whose character he can gauge; Frei fits both criteria. Moreover, he comes from within the parliamentary group itself; from 2021 to 2025, Frei served as First Parliamentary Secretary (PGF)—the second most important role after the group leader.

On domestic policy, Frei is considered a hardliner: a few years ago, he contemplated abolishing the individual right to asylum. As the son of a police officer, security issues are close to his heart, and he recently advocated for bolstering the intelligence services.

On a personal level, he is respected and liked across party lines. Frei is someone everyone gets along with—tough on the issues, yet always friendly in tone. If some members of the parliamentary group are shedding a tear that the role didn't go to the CSU’s Alexander Dobrindt, it is because Frei was involved in many of the mistakes the government made during its brief term in office—and there were quite a few of them.

When the Union voted alongside the AfD in early 2025—even before its actual term in office began—it played out like a slow-motion accident. As Parliamentary Group Manager, Frei shared responsibility for managing the situation (the parliamentary group leader was Friedrich Merz); the CDU—supposedly so seasoned in the exercise of power—stumbled into the entire affair in a way that prompted a worrying question: Is this the force that intends to stop the AfD? The CDU prefers not to be reminded of the incident, but the SPD and the Greens have not forgotten it. So, is the supposedly safe solution really the more stable one?

Frei himself considers the concerns regarding his management skills to be unfair. The accusations that, as Head of the Chancellery, he spent too little time in the office and too much in the public eye actually stem primarily from his early days—specifically, an instance where he skipped a coalition committee meeting in favor of a local savings bank event. Moreover, Heads of the Chancellery inevitably serve as lightning rods for criticism; there is hardly one among them who hasn't, at some point, been labeled part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Frei maintains that he has learned a great deal over the past year.

For a long time, the machinery had been running roughly—with friction between the Chancellor (who spent much of his time abroad for good reason), the Chancellery, and the parliamentary groups. In January of this year, Merz dismissed his chief of staff, Jacob Schrot. To many in his party, this was a sacrificial move—and evidence that the Chancellor’s own learning curve was rather shallow. After all, a more extensive restructuring would have amounted to an admission by Merz that his initial staffing choices had been suboptimal.

Government operations only began to improve in recent weeks after Jens Spahn, Alexander Hoffmann (CSU), and Matthias Miersch (SPD) were brought into the so-called "Sherpa process"—the circle of preliminary negotiators who scope out and sort through issues before the party leaders make the final decisions.

Relations with the federal states remained rocky right up to the end, and over fundamental issues at that. The states remained unmoved and let the "relief bonus"—with which the coalition had hoped to delight employees at the employers' expense—fail in the Bundesrat. Across party lines, officials from the states noted that Merz, unlike many of his predecessors, had never sat in the circle of state premiers. That said, the same applied to Angela Merkel.

In the view of many within the CDU and CSU, the parliamentary group would have voted for Dobrindt as their new leader. Yet Markus Söder and Friedrich Merz made the decision regarding the new frontman pretty much on their own. Ultimately, it is said, the deciding factor for Söder was that he did not want Dobrindt to become too prominent a figure alongside himself—the central star of the Christian Social Union. Furthermore, many in his party believe Söder wanted to keep Ilse Aigner—the president of the state parliament in Munich—from taking over the ministerial post by promoting her straight to the role of Federal President instead. Having two CSU figures in top offices would simply be too much.

Nina Warken, the health policy spokesperson, did not get the job either. In recent days, CDU women had strongly urged the Chancellor to consider female politicians in the reshuffle. Warken herself, however, was reportedly not particularly enthusiastic about the prospect of working for the parliamentary group in the near future. Her moving into the Chancellery now is considered unlikely.

Matthias Miersch (SPD) and Jens Spahn had recently put on such a conspicuous display of "bromance" as a parliamentary group leadership duo that they were already getting on the nerves of some members in both caucuses. Yet it was genuine—and hard-won. A year ago, the government—and the relationship between the SPD and the Union—was at a low point; contrary to its pledge, the CDU had failed to appoint Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf as a constitutional court judge. Miersch and Spahn decided: We need to lock arms. In August, they held a joint strategy retreat in Würzburg with Alexander Hoffmann; the "spirit of the Hotel Rebstock" was subsequently praised and celebrated by all; in September, Spahn and Miersch took the night train to Kyiv.

Frei, however, will not be able to forge an instant bond with Miersch on a trip; the transition is taking place while business is in full swing. At least they already know each other in two capacities: from the parliamentary group and from their work on the reform package. As parliamentary group leader, Frei must now secure majorities for the reforms he previously orchestrated from the Chancellery. He will hardly be able to pin the blame on the Chief of

As the saying goes: The void he left behind replaced him completely. In this case, a strategically crucial void must be filled. It has not yet been decided who will succeed Frei at the Chancellery. Government sources stated that respect for the office of parliamentary group leader demanded that attention be focused "solely on this personnel decision." The succession at the Chancellery would be handled separately, with the Chancellor set to make a decision "swiftly."

Text translated by Google Translate, mistakes are my own.

This is an excellent, street level report by the New York Times of the recent anti-immigration protests, harassment and bigotry that has swept through South Africa.

It follows one particular anti-immigration activist/vigilante and one of her victims - a lawful immigrant from Congo whose home was broken into by a mob and whose family was illegally kicked out with their young children.

I have posted a lot about these xenophobic protests before. The reason I wanted to post this story too is because it is coming from the New York Times, the epitome of the mainstream media. There is a narrative that the Left or the mainstream ignore these kinds of actions because it is not happening in the West. This narrative is false. The NYT is covering it. The Guardian wrote an editorial with a strong condemnation. Mayor Mamdani condemned xenophobia while giving the Nelson Mandela lecture. And South Africa's trade unions and domestic left have organised in support of migrants and urged the government to protect people from harassment and intimidation.

What this article does nicely is to take you up close and to show that this really is xenophobia. South Africa's macroeconomic situation is different from the West. Our unemployment rate is sky high and our inequality is the worst in the world. You can have a discussion about the role of immigration in alleviating or worsening this situation. But there is no excuse for breaking into the home of a family of lawful, assimilated immigrants, evicting them and literally making their children cry.

A More Accurate Portrait of Homeownership

A better metric shows that homeownership is even less common among younger Canadians than official statistics suggest.

The traditional homeownership rate metric is misleading. Fortunately, the Minnesota Fed just came up with a better measure.

Here at the Missing Middle, we frequently write about and talk about homeownership rates and post a lot of graphs like the one below, from our piece The Homeownership Journey Is Broken. Policymakers Need to Repair It:

Figure 1: Homeownership Rate by Age Cohort and Year, Canada

The problem with the metric becomes apparent when we chart the homeownership rate for every age group, including 15-19 years, as shown in Figure 2:

Figure 2: Homeownership Rate by Age, Canada, 2021, Traditional Definition

A homeownership rate of 16% for individuals between the ages of 15-19 would strike most people as absurd, but the data is accurate. The problem is with how statistical agencies define homeownership. It is simply the proportion of families that own the house they live in. But very few 15-19-year-olds are the head of a family in the first place, so they are neither owners nor renters. They are absent from the calculation entirely.

This absence from the calculation matters, as the traditional homeownership rate measure does not capture phenomena such as people in their 20s and 30s living with their parents longer. This problem has been recognized for some time, so the Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota decided to address it. In their piece New homeownership measure puts people first they created a new metric, the “homeowners-to-population ratio”, which measures the percentage of the population that owns a home, either as an individual or as a couple.

In an instructive infographic, the piece shows how factors such as older family members or adult children living with homeowners, or roommates living with the owner of a home, are captured under their new metric, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Traditional vs. Minnesota Fed Measures of Homeownership Rates

Fortunately, Census 2021 contains enough data to calculate homeownership rates using the new Minnesota Fed definition. Figure 4 shows that, under the Minnesota Fed definition, homeownership rates fall dramatically for persons under the age of 40, and those over the age of 85. This better captures the phenomenon of younger people living with their parents longer, and the elderly living with relatives or in long-term care homes. Under the Minnesota Fed definition, the homeownership rates for 15- 19-year-olds in Canada are effectively zero, a much more sensible result.

Figure 4: Homeownership Rate by Age, Canada, 2021, Two Definitions

The new definition causes homeownership rates to fall by 15 percentage points for those under the age of 30, 10 points for those between 30 and 34, and a whopping 20 points for those over the age of 85.

Figure 5: Homeownership Rate by Age, Canada, 2021, Two Definitions

A few other points stand out to us:

• Even under the new definition, those aged 85 and up are still more likely to be homeowners in Canada than those between the ages of 30 to 34. The rate at which older Canadians sell their homes and move into other forms of housing is vastly overestimated by Canadian policy-makers, particularly at the municipal level.
• Further to the previous point, those aged between 75 and 84 have higher homeownership rates under the new definition than any age category under age 50.
• In 2021, less than one-quarter of all Canadians between the ages of 25 and 29 owned the home they lived in, either as an individual or a couple.

This new definition of homeownership from the Minnesota Fed is far more sensible than the traditional definition, and we are grateful that they created it. Where possible, we will utilize their definition in future work.

Ukraine offers lessons in how to keep infrastructure alive in wartime.

Archive:
https://archive.ph/oycHu

When Iran struck two Amazon Web Services (AWS) data centers in the United Arab Emirates and damaged a third in Bahrain in early March, Washington quickly deemed the Gulf’s artificial intelligence ambitions a catastrophic strategic miscalculation. Gulf states had made a multihundred-billion-dollar bet on AI infrastructure in a volatile, risky region.

The proposed solution was to relocate AI workloads that operate out of the Gulf to safer locations. This rested on two beliefs: The Gulf is too unstable for critical infrastructure, and there is no playbook for building AI infrastructure in such contested territory.

Both assumptions deserve examination, and the second is not true. A playbook already exists, written under far heavier fire, in Europe. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kyiv has kept its digital infrastructure running through sustained bombardment. It moved terabytes of government data across borders in a matter of weeks to keep government services functioning and the state digitally intact, rebuilt its power grid and broader architecture around the assumption of continued Russian aerial attacks, and treated survivability as the core design principle of its critical infrastructure and, by extension, of its own survival and ultimate victory in the war.

The comparison is imperfect, and the differences in geography and war intensity matter. But Ukraine remains the only state to have stress-tested its digital infrastructure in a full-scale war with a bigger enemy, and its lessons map onto the Gulf’s AI buildup after the Iran war. The question facing Gulf capitals is how they can adapt Kyiv’s wartime playbook to their own threat environment.

The case for relocating the Gulf’s compute ambitions rests on a fundamental misreading of why Gulf states are dedicating enormous resources to AI. The core belief in Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, Doha, and other Gulf capitals is clear: They cannot miss the next economic transformation that will reshape geopolitical powers and their countries’ place in the global order. They missed the Industrial Revolution, and when the post-World War II energy-dependent global order enriched them financially, the gains lacked strategic depth, leaving their political economy tied to the oil boom. AI is seen differently, almost existentially, for Gulf states.

It is therefore unsurprising that the Iranian attacks haven’t deter the Gulf’s compute buildout. Instead, the war has reframed the question entirely. It is no longer about whether to build—the Gulf will keep building compute, with no sign of changing course—but about how to build compute infrastructure in a contested environment prone to sharp shifts in security and military conditions. This turns on three factors.

First, given the political commitment to AI, the capital financing the Gulf’s AI buildout is not a case of venture capital chasing quarterly, or even yearly, returns. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are sovereign states financing their post-hydrocarbon future. They are not venture investors who flee when the war starts.

The Gulf might look into South Korea’s industrialization at breakneck speed, precisely when U.S. security guarantees appeared to waver in the early 1970s. Taiwan built the world’s most strategically indispensable semiconductor cluster under five decades of the threat of invasion. Strategic pressure concentrates national investment on priority fields, rather than leading to hasty withdrawals at the first sign of trouble.

Second, as the binding constraint on AI shifts to the energy needed to sustain the workload, the Gulf’s energy abundance and cheaper production costs make it a natural home for AI infrastructure. Frontier AI is, fundamentally, a function of electricity—reliable, affordable access to sufficient power underlies every state’s AI ambitions. To the point, the Gulf possesses the cheapest and most abundant power on the planet. Iranian attacks might disrupt external access to energy or raise costs, but they do not change the fundamental reality that the Gulf’s energy profile is unmatched. Beyond crude oil, the Gulf is undergoing a major pivot toward energy diversification: nuclear, renewables, and natural gas to provide the reliable, affordable power required for training and deploying large language models at scale. As AI economics shift toward intelligence per dollar, the Gulf’s cost advantage in energy production becomes critical. Inference, the compute-intensive but lower-margin phase of AI deployment, requires massive scale and cheap power, making the Gulf a natural hub for inference workloads.

Finally, geography adds a third factor. AI is evolving from training models to serving them at scale, with inference delivered to billions of users with minimal latency. Proximity becomes the product itself. A data center in Virginia or Frankfurt cannot serve South Asia, East Africa, or the Eastern Mediterranean without introducing delays that degrade user experience or introduce cross-border data complications. And maybe this doesn’t matter with text models, but it will matter most for physical AI. The Gulf sits within inference-grade latency of these markets. A latency advantage of this kind cannot be relocated.

The buildout in the Gulf will therefore continue. Gulf leaders have said as much, repeatedly and on the record. The honest task before Gulf policymakers and their U.S. hyperscaler partners is to ensure that AI infrastructure gets built and can survive as this “no war, no peace” situation drags on with no end in sight. In fact, even if it ends, the Iranian threat will always shadow the AI buildup. On that question, one country has more hard-won experience than any other, and that’s Ukraine.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the nation’s digital infrastructure lived where most states keep theirs: in large, centralized, on-premises facilities. This architecture is efficient in peacetime and catastrophically fragile in war. Within weeks, Kyiv tore it apart and improvised a new one under fire. Two moves defined the transformation, and each offers a template for the Gulf.

The first was emergency cloud migration. In the war’s opening days, Ukraine’s parliament passed emergency legislation amending its data protection laws to permit government data to leave national territory. Over roughly three months, working with AWS, the government migrated some 15 petabytes of data from more than 50 institutions onto foreign cloud servers beyond the reach of Russian missiles. The state’s registries, tax records, and critical services were effectively backed up across borders. A Russian warhead could destroy a building in Kyiv; it could no longer destroy the Ukrainian state’s memory.

On energy, Russia made Ukraine’s power grid a primary target, which meant every data facility had to assume grid failure. New Ukrainian infrastructure is built around redundant, decentralized power: dedicated solar arrays paired with battery storage and plans for small modular reactors to guarantee uptime through extended blackouts.

The Gulf should transfer Ukraine’s innovations to its own infrastructure build-outs, adapting them to the region’s own needs and creating a new standard for compute security with the Gulf’s mark for the years to come. It’s no surprise, then, that Ukraine showed up in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar after the Iran war began. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky toured the Gulf in March, selling Ukraine’s drone and missile defense expertise as Iranian attacks hit the region.

Still, the Gulf is not Ukraine. It is far wealthier, faces a different adversary, and is building infrastructure two orders of magnitude larger: gigawatt-scale campuses rather than wartime capacity. But the design principles translate directly, and in several respects, the Gulf can implement them better than Ukraine ever could.

The current announced road map consists of 10 to 12 gigawatts of capacity spread across the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. These gigawatts aren’t concentrated in one place; they’re divided across three countries. And by virtue of the region’s geography, they aren’t repeating Ukraine’s prewar situation: clustering strategic capacity in target-rich zones.

The first task in wartime is hardening existing infrastructure. In practical terms, compute that serves sovereign, military, and security workloads should be hardened in its construction or built underground, much like other sensitive state assets shielded that way to avoid aerial targeting: placed below ground, away from the coast, and beyond easy reach of low-cost drones and cruise missiles. Concretely, that means battle-tested hardening across the entire campus footprint: earth berms and reinforced concrete to defeat blast, fragmentation, and drone-borne munitions; fully buried power substations, transformers, fuel storage, and cooling loops; cleared surrounding terrain to deny cover to low-flying drones and improve defensive fields of fire; and modular, compartmentalized designs with on-site generation, redundant microgrids, and automated failover so a facility can absorb a partial strike and keep running at reduced capacity rather than collapsing entirely.

Energy resilience, moreover, must become nonnegotiable. The Gulf’s cheap, abundant power is its core competitive advantage in the AI infrastructure era, but the war has demonstrated that energy infrastructure itself is a target. Ukraine’s response to heavy Russian bombardment through co-locating solar with storage, with modular nuclear on the horizon, maps naturally onto the Gulf, which already leads the region in utility-scale solar and civil nuclear power. Each major campus should be capable of operating independently of the national grid for extended periods. Gulf states should rethink their understanding of energy resilience as a form of air defense by other means.

The Iran war should force a critical rethinking. Gulf states have spent years building data sovereignty regimes that run counter to cloud deployment. These Gulf capitals need not abandon sovereignty, but they should build the wartime exception in advance. Pre-negotiated frameworks with hyperscalers should specify which workloads can surge to facilities abroad, under what controls, and on whose authority, executable in hours rather than months. The continuity of the digital state should never depend on emergency legislation drafted under fire.

Finally, doctrine must evolve. The March strikes confirmed that data centers have joined refineries, ports, and desalination plants as infrastructure that adversaries will deliberately target. Gulf countries’ air and missile defenses performed credibly in the war’s opening months, intercepting the overwhelming majority of incoming ballistic missiles and drones. But that architecture was designed to protect cities and military bases, not gigawatt-scale compute clusters. Whether through dedicated point defenses tied to major campuses, prioritization within layered national systems, or both, compute must now be defended with the same seriousness as energy infrastructure. The costs of that defense must be priced into project economics from day one.

Iran’s strikes on Gulf data centers carried an identical message to Russia’s on Ukraine: This region is too dangerous for the compute capacity you are building. The Gulf’s answer should mirror Kyiv’s response—not retreat but a redesign of the buildup.

The Ukraine war gave us clear clues on what infrastructure redesign requires: hardened and dispersed facilities, resilient energy systems, flexible cross-border data legislation, and air defense systems, all cost-priced into project finances from the start. None of this is cheap, and none of it featured in the Gulf states’ gigawatt-scale original vision. The Gulf’s positioning as one of the main global compute nodes will be decided not by how many gigawatts it announces but by how many are actually built during this long Iran war and, most importantly, still running the day after Iran’s next attack.

Relevant as large banks, finance, and corruption are very topical both in the EU and internationally.

A predatory opposition, fueled by external support, is gaining influence within the state.

SUBMISSION STATMENT:
https://archive.ph/NxdRp

On April 1, two months before Armenia’s parliamentary elections, Russian President Vladimir Putin invited Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Moscow for bilateral talks. Their conversation made Putin visibly uncomfortable. The Russian president insisted that Armenia must choose between Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union, arguing that Moscow’s experience with Ukraine demonstrated the impossibility of membership in both.

Pashinyan, who speaks fluent Russian, countered that Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union remains fully compatible with deepening and diversifying relations with the European Union. As he put it, legally and administratively, this joint engagement with both blocs is real, and “it is a fact.” Putin repeatedly pressed that Armenia needs to make a geopolitical choice. Pashinyan responded by emphasizing Armenia’s commitment to maintaining strong ties with Russia while simultaneously expanding its relationships with other partners.

As Putin advanced what could be called the Kremlin’s false geopolitical binary, Pashinyan responded with a form of geopolitical jujitsu, highlighting mutual interest, underscoring legal dimensions of Armenia’s membership in Eurasian Economic Union, and leveraging his country’s continued participation in Russia-centric institutions. Pashinyan argued that a more stable and regionally integrated South Caucasus would ultimately strengthen Armenia-Russia relations as well.

The meeting was a dramatic enactment of the clash between Putin’s wish to impose Russia on Armenia and Pashinyan’s efforts for “balanced and balancing” foreign policy for his country. Two months later, elections gave Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party a parliamentary majority. This denied the Russia-linked opposition a path to power.

While congratulations quickly arrived from abroad, Russia has yet to recognize the results. Instead, Russia-linked parties have challenged the outcome while hinting at mobilizing social unrest. When the Constitutional Court upheld the results earlier this month, five out of 18 political parties—two of which have cleared the electoral threshold to enter parliament—announced their intention to remove “the current regime” and begin “a new, more systematic, institutional and large-scale phase of political resistance.”

Pashinyan may have described the election outcome as “historic,” but Russia still succeeded in reasserting its stake over Armenia’s opposition and parliamentary integrity more broadly.

It is for this and other reasons that viewing the parliamentary election results merely as a geopolitical “pivot” away from Russia and toward the West—the dominant interpretation in global media—is an incomplete analysis. Though Armenia has thus far partially resisted Putin’s geopolitical binary, its elections were revealing as to how Russia continues to manage and control states in its periphery.

There are also learnings from Armenia’s story for other countries and contexts. Whereas democratic decline often stems from executive aggrandizement and attacks on the opposition, as in Hungary or Turkey, Armenia’s is a different pathway: A predatory opposition, fueled by external support, is gaining influence within the state. In a weakly institutionalized democracy with a thin party system, Armenia illustrates how such actors can undermine democratic accountability.

In many ways, Armenia’s challenge for strengthening representative politics in the post-Soviet neighborhood resembles those facing mature democracies.

In Armenia’s most recent election, the Kremlin utilized a variety of overt and covert measures to support political parties with links to Russia. These measures ranged from influence operations inside Armenia to electoral bribes and economic coercion.

But for Russia, it is always less about who will be elected, and more about how electoral politics and its aftermath will unfold. Maintaining pressure on state institutions before and after the elections has been the Kremlin’s goal all along. Fearmongering and polarization are among the broader toolkit that the Kremlin uses in Armenia as well as in other post-Soviet states, such as Georgia; Moldova; Kazakhstan; and, before Russia’s war there, Ukraine.

First, the strategy of polarization is carried out by supporting a politically unaccountable economic elite patronage network. In post-Soviet states, these networks emerged during the first few decades after the bloc’s collapse, bolstered by senior religious figures from these states.

Russia’s support for former authoritarian elites does more than influence elections. Rather than adapting to the new rules of democratic competition, old elites retain incentives to challenge institutions, delegitimize electoral outcomes, and obstruct the emergence of a credible opposition and work toward parliamentary integrity. The Russian support incentivizes them to challenge democratic institutions, which is why Armenian democracy lacks robust opposition politics.

Every new democracy must contend with the challenge of integrating old elites. According to studies by James Lexton, former ruling groups often reorganize as opposition parties, bringing with them entrenched economic interests and external linkages. Between 1974 and 2010, of the 65 countries that underwent democratization, 74 percent produced at least one prominent authoritarian successor party. Countries as diverse as Ghana, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Paraguay, South Korea, and Tunisia have grappled with such quasi-oppositional forces. Authoritarian successor parties, in short, are the rule rather than the exception.

Nascent democracies in Russia’s neighborhood face the dual challenge of integrating illiberal political forces into democratic institutions while safeguarding the liberal principles on which those institutions rest. Compounding this, the behavior of former ruling elites is often shaped less by accountability to domestic electorates than by political and material incentives provided by Moscow.

The second strategy that the Russian state has been using in its external neighborhoods is to generate perennial insecurity, whether economic or strategic. Stephen Kotkin described and defined this strategy as the “perpetual geopolitics” of the Russian state. Russian “rescue narratives” long reinforced Moscow’s role as the Caucasus’s primary security broker.

However, the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023—despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers—and Azerbaijan’s attacks on Armenia’s internationally recognized borders in 2021 and 2022—to which the Russia-centric Collective Security Treaty Organization failed to respond—exposed the hollowness of Russia’s security guarantees.

In Armenia, the Kremlin has fueled anxiety over the Washington accords—signed between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States last August—as well as U.S. support for road and railway connectivity via Armenia’s southern border. Russia’s fresh economic warfare on Armenia and threats to increase energy prices heighten these anxieties.

Armenia’s democratic vulnerabilities do not stem solely from Russia’s “perpetual geopolitics.” They are also shaped by the broader regional environment, particularly the incentives and constraints facing neighboring Azerbaijan’s highly personalized authoritarian system, where the logic of regional integration collides with the political imperatives of that regime.

Regional openness, now more possible following Armenia’s parliamentary elections, could help diversify Azerbaijan’s energy-dependent economy by boosting connectivity, investment, and global market access. Yet it also threatens the political insulation that underpins Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s rule by reducing state control over information, movement, and economic actors. Personalized autocracies often view trade less as a public good than as a tool of political control, making them wary of the pluralizing the effects of regional integration. Azerbaijan’s land borders remain closed since the 2020 Covid pandemic.

Such unresolved political challenges inside Azerbaijan elevate Baku’s value for the Kremlin. As Aliyev failed to sign the peace agreement that he and Pashinyan initialed in Washington in August, the door remains open for Baku-Kremlin authoritarian coordination to maintain insecurity as a perennial condition in the South Caucasus.

In addition to entrenched elites undermining institutions, Armenia’s experience reflects a broader crisis of political representation as parties increasingly lose both their effectiveness and their capacity to represent citizens.

Georgia’s democratic backsliding over the past decade demonstrates that a pro-Western geopolitical orientation is no guarantee of democratic consolidation. While Armenia remains focused on transforming the South Caucasus by advancing infrastructural connectivity and sustainable regional diplomacy, regionally untethered democratic transition such as that seen in Georgia ends up complicating the trajectories of democratic consolidation. Still, Georgia and Armenia demonstrate the continuing power of civic mobilization as a source of democratic resilience, particularly when formal political institutions lose their efficacy or outright attack the foundations of the state.

The Armenian case complicates broadly established democratic theories that rest on the push and pull between incumbent and opposition political parties as the main engine to drive the maturity and growth of representative democracies. The emergence of a functional, homegrown opposition is particularly difficult when authoritarian successor parties retain vast resources, entrenched patronage networks, and external support.

New strategies for safeguarding Armenia’s democratic trajectory, both from the Armenian government and its partners and friends on both sides of the Atlantic, are needed.

On the bright side, there is significant public trust in electoral politics, local levels of government, and the overall direction of where the country is headed, with 61 percent of Armenians surveyed in May  expressing support for it. Trust in political institutions has also increased over the two past few years, and even the courts, traditionally lacking in public trust, have registered improvements. Armenia’s democratic system is largely stable, like a three-legged stool, but whether it can sustain the growing complexity of its increasingly digital economic system, and do so in Russia’s strategic shadow, is far from assured.

To address the problem of perpetual geopolitics in the South Caucasus, Armenia’s partners can elevate their work toward consolidating the peace process and reducing heightened insecurity. National security concerns have dropped as a primary issue, falling from 43 percent in December 2023 to 17 percent in May of this year, but the fragility of the peace process fuels support for illiberal opposition.

Armenia’s growing list of partners and allies needs to spend serious political capital to improve the security conditions in the South Caucasus, addressing Azerbaijan’s subtle obstruction of the peace process. The Armenian case reveals that serious investments in improving security conditions can help to legitimize democratic institutions and create political space to deepen the workings of representative democracy. In Moldova and Georgia, heightened insecurity and unresolved conflicts will continue to derail democratization.

Serious investments in the peace process would strengthen the legitimacy of Armenia’s governing institutions, a critical asset in managing Russia’s enduring pressure. Externally, providing economic dividends for Armenia’s democratic trajectory by supporting the peace process and advancing the regional modernization in the South Caucasus can go a long way in weakening support for illiberal political parties, sustained and nourished from the Kremlin. Internally, in the absence of credible parliamentary opposition, democratic resilience may depend on strengthening civic life beyond parliament.

This means new avenues and platforms of public debate, such as town halls in villages and municipal governments, and—especially for countries in Russia’s vicinity, considering the collapse of foreign aid from donor countries that have long sustained civil society—tax reforms to incentivize public support for civic groups.

Looking ahead, Russia’s pressure on Armenia is likely to intensify, ranging from economic coercion to efforts by its local proxies to foment social unrest. Yet each new attempt at coercion has also accelerated Armenia’s search for alternatives. Russian restrictions on Armenian agricultural exports, for example, prompted the European Union to extend tariff-free access for many Armenian products that had previously been destined for the Russian market. While EU membership is not on the horizon, the Kremlin’s persistent efforts to force Armenia into a geopolitical binary are likely to produce the opposite effect: economic partnerships, rapid tariff-free access to the unified market of the European Union, and a deeper diversification of Armenia’s foreign policy.

Between the agreement initialed in Washington, growing ties with Armenia, and the EU’s rapid response to Russia’s economic pressure, one lesson is clear: Strengthening regional environments and state capacity to deliver for citizens is essential. While Russia’s “pivot politics”—its forced and fabricated geopolitical binary—provided an important backdrop to Amenia’s recent election and certainly influenced voter considerations, domestic performance by politicians also mattered. The state’s ability to address socioeconomic concerns, including healthcare, pensions, infrastructure, rural development, and employment, shaped voter preferences.

That’s why democratic resilience depends on state capacity and everyday governance, regardless of whether opposition parties fulfill their role. Even in Russia’s geopoliticized peripheries, “all politics is local.”

Abundance is really a radical framework that challenges all Dem party factions (and Republicans too!) and I don’t understand why pundits cannot get this

There’s nothing moderate about wanting to undo a century of federal, state, and local land use policy to 10x the rate of housing construction. Or break the labor cartels created by doctors, lawyers, and other white collar professions to push up costs for everyday consumers. Or remake America’s transportation system by building thousands of miles of high-speed rail. Or transform our energy grid with tons of new clean energy and infrastructure. I could go on—abundance envisions big changes!

In our broken polarization framework, ideas that represent a huge shift from the status quo get framed as “moderate” because they sometimes involve markets rather than state intervention. But exclusionary zoning and doctor cartels and veto-ridden planning don’t fit on the moderate-progressive spectrum, or even the left-right spectrum. They are just bad policies with massive negative consequences—namely higher costs for consumers and taxpayers—that earlier generations supported and entrenched interests continue baking into American life

The cool thing about abundance is it completely breaks the political polarization framework. Ultra-progressive NYC mayor Zohran Mamdani worked with moderate New York Governor Kathy Hochul to reform environmental laws that blocked sustainable housing and transit. Super-lefty California State Senator Scott Wiener passed the state’s biggest upzoning in history with votes across factional and party lines. Texas has exponential clean energy growth because their permitting is more chill

The abundance framework can help people who identify with any faction deliver better results. Whether it gets broadly adopted across issue areas remains to be seen because it’s still early days. The most politically developed abundance-y movement, YIMBYism, is barely a decade old. Everything else is nascent. But lawmakers are learning: Abundance-coded bills like The Road to Housing Act passed with overwhelming bipartisan majorities and support across factional lines. To me, passing historic federal legislation with support from across the Democratic Party suggests the abundance framework is doing just fine

I wrote a full article here about abundance’s impact and defiance of political polarization