Article by Miles Taylor chief of staff at the Department of Homeland Security during Trump's 1st term.

Non-paywalled link:

https://archive.is/u9tPG

A lot has happened in the half year since U.S. Special Forces kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and his wife, Cilia Flores, but if you can think back that far you might recall that the Trump administration insisted the mission wasn’t an invasion; it was an “extradition.” It was a legal matter, that is, to be followed by a criminal trial. Many legal scholars, commentators and government officials lined up to endorse that choice as lawful, despite Venezuela’s immediate insistence to the contrary. But when Mr. Maduro’s case next makes its way to court, on July 22, federal prosecutors could encounter one rather significant obstacle: Our courts don’t have the authority to handle his case. And the law that says so was signed by the United States of America.

If the United States honors its agreement, it could well be forced to release its prized captive.

The reason dates back to the first decades of the 20th century, when a topic that seems dry and legalistic today — international arbitration — was an exciting and idealistic cause, championed as a modern, rational tool of justice with the power to change the world.

Years later, when peace was restored, the United States began including arbitration clauses in many treaties. One of those was a 1922 extradition treaty between the United States and Venezuela. It states, in part, that “all differences between the contracting parties relating to the interpretation or execution of this treaty shall be decided by arbitration.” Approved by the Senate and ratified by the president, that document has the force of law.

Well, there sure are “differences between the contracting parties” today. The government of Venezuela is playing along with the Trump administration when it comes to oil exports, but it has publicly insisted that Mr. Maduro’s capture was illegal under international law — and that would include the extradition treaty.

A dispute of this nature should clearly trigger the 1922 treaty’s arbitration clause. According to its stipulations, Judge Alvin Hellerstein, who is overseeing Mr. Maduro’s trial, must suspend the proceedings and send the matter to a panel of independent evaluators to examine the treaty and decide whether it has been honored. Should the arbitrators conclude that Mr. Maduro’s capture violated the treaty, the United States would be required to release him.

Does it sound far-fetched? The Supreme Court has affirmed the principle again and again in cases spanning more than a century.

I guess technically Palestine isn’t really a secessionist or separatist movement, which might answer my own question. Still, Spain taking the position that Palestinians are entitled to self-determine to the point of autonomy while wagging their finger at their own citizens seems inconsistent. I don’t really buy that the Spanish government takes this position purely out of solidarity with popular leftists. Looking for more of a realpolitik answer.

Trump’s new Iran forever war may have, at least partially, excluded America from future cheap/easy access to some Mideast oil. And now, Pete Hoekstra says America wants another 3-4 million barrels of oil per day from Canada on top of the 3-4 million barrels of oil per day that Canada is currently supplying. This should cover unreliable Mideast sources and account for future needs (Canada has a 160 year supply). But instead of negotiating in good faith, Trump kicks the table over, as his character demands. Regardless, the new threat shows an urgency to act on a trade deal with Canada sooner rather than later.

Hi everyone!

I've recently started studying International Relations on my own. I finished an introductory IR course and have started reading CFR articles and taking notes, but I'm realizing that there's a huge difference between consuming information and actually building a strong foundation.

If you could go back to the beginning, knowing what you know now, what would you prioritize during your first year of studying?

I'm especially interested in:

- International law

- Diplomacy and foreign policy

- The Middle East

- Developing strong analytical skills rather than simply memorizing events

I'm particularly curious about things like:

- Books or journals that genuinely changed how you think.

- Habits that helped you become better at analyzing international affairs.

- Mistakes you made early on that you'd avoid today.

- Skills that turned out to matter far more than you expected.

I'd also love to hear your own story. If you work (or have worked) in diplomacy, foreign affairs, academia, a think tank, international law, or an international organization, how did you get there? Was your path what you originally expected, or did it take some unexpected turns?

I'm not looking for shortcuts, just trying to build a solid foundation and learn from people who've already walked this road.

Thank you in advance. I really appreciate any advice or stories you're willing to share!

I would have LOVED to garner insight from Chinese people but it's IMPOSSIBLE to ask ANY serious questions or engage in ANY serious discussion about China or anything Chinese to learn about China in the Chinese subs because the mods in ALL of them ​ (r/China, r/AskAChinese, r/chinalife, r/AskChina) would immediately remove your post no matter how much engagement or up votes your post gets or how much in good faith your query was posed. I'm not sure if it's due to a massive chip all of the mods collectively seem to happen to have on their shoulders which causes them to immediately assume slight where there is none, or if it's a deliberate agenda to keep everything about China secretive to the world. In either case, it's extremely difficult to llearn about China from outside China regardless of how positive the frame you are coming from is or how fascinated you are of it. It becomes disheartening after some time and you start to eventually lose interest at best or feel negatively towards it at worse, which is ironic given that that is what it forced upon you when the feeling you came with was the contrary.

So after spending 3 hours searching for the most suitable sub to ask this question in, in the hopes of getting the answers that the Chinese subs fail to do, I pose this question here.

hi guys, I always read ww2 material and one author that is always there, when the subject is the German army, is Basil Liddell Hart.

I know he reviewed Rommel's writings and talked to Guderian in a POW camp. Developed some controversies based on his influences with the German generals - as if he was a major influence on German military doctrine. And, also, created the myth of "clean German forces", as if the genocide and the mass murders were solely the fault of Hitler and Nazi officials.

I think that his completely unethical method might have ruined his whole career, but i read a bit of Strategy (2016 edition) and thought it was a exquisite book, nonetheless, i never had Liddell Hart at University, nor cited on class. Reading about him, i noticed that Mearsheimer wrote a book about, criticizing but also making a comprehensive study on the indirect approach.

In terms of science, is Hart still relevant physically at Universities as an obligatory reading or Clausewitz made the ultimate reference (i read Clausewitz in very different disciplines and in an international conflicts study group)?

Here we are again: Iran is shooting at traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, Donald Trump is ordering retaliatory strikes, and both sides have declared the latest cease-fire agreement “over” or “dead.”

Unfortunately, the United States has precious few options left for breaking the deadlock over the strait. And those it does have are neither appealing nor likely to succeed.

The June memorandum of understanding that paused the fighting between Iran and the U.S. was ambiguously worded. Each side chose the interpretation that would best support its claim to control the Strait of Hormuz.

The Iranians likely believe that their best option is to stay the course and stick to their maximalist demands. They don’t need to damage many ships to effectively shut down the strait; the threat of attack is enough to persuade most ship owners not to attempt to transit, even if insurance is available. This means that Iran needs very few missiles, drones, or mines to close the strait down. And it can withstand the U.S. blockade: Its economy appears reasonably stable, as it has continued exporting oil sufficient to meet its needs throughout the war. It also has a captive population that has grown used to sanctions and economic pain.

The U.S. is effectively left with four options. Each of them is terrible in its own way. It can stay the current course. It can make life in Iran impossible. It can declare victory and go home. Or it can launch a ground invasion.

• Staying the course means continuing to rely on air strikes against Iran’s military, leadership, and infrastructure as a punitive tool to obtain concessions at the bargaining table. The administration has pursued this strategy for a few months now, and Iranian demands have not budged. It may also mean continuing to expend munitions in the hope of completely eliminating Iran’s capacity to strike shipping targets. This is a Sisyphean task. Worse, it is draining U.S. stockpiles and leaving America ill-prepared for another conflict.
• The second option is to ramp up the bombing campaign to such an extent that life in Iran becomes unlivable. The U.S. took this approach to Japan at the end of World War II, through both bombing and a naval blockade. This sort of ultimatum places Washington in an escalation trap. If attacks on roads and electrical infrastructure don’t bring Iran to its knees, water and oil likely will be the next targets. Iran’s leaders understand that water is one of their country’s greatest vulnerabilities. They have made clear that if the U.S. strikes the infrastructure needed to keep their people alive, they will retaliate in kind against the Gulf States. The U.S. would struggle to defend them against that sort of attack. Targeting electrical and water infrastructure is the option that cuts most cleanly through the Gordian knot of the Iranian conflict, but such actions would lead to mass death and a flood of refugees, and they would turn the world against the United States.
• Another option is for Trump to simply give in to Iran’s demands, declare that he has solved the problem and gotten the best deal imaginable, and walk away. The memorandum of understanding appeared to enact this option.
• Finally, the U.S. could choose to put troops on the ground. However, it lacks the manpower and logistical support to mount a land campaign into Iran. Even seizing tiny Kharg Island would be an exceptionally risky move that might not have the intended effect if it succeeded. As the defending nation, Iran has the “home court” advantage.

The U.S. and Iran are locked in a stalemate where neither can neutralize the other’s advantages, nor forcibly compel the other to accept unfavorable peace terms. We have seen a similar dynamic playing out in Ukraine. The U.S. does not have the munitions to continue the current bombing campaign indefinitely. The Trump administration appears to face an unpalatable choice between accepting Iranian hegemony over the strait—or initiating cycles of escalation that cannot end well.

Here is a copy of the rest of the article.

According to this report “Hsiao said Taiwan does not accept Papua New Guinea's unilateral decision. He said the representative office would remain open, safeguard Taiwan's rights and interests, and provide necessary services to Taiwanese.”

How exactly would this even work? I can’t recall a single contemporary example of an “embassy” outright rejecting to acknowledge its host country’s request for closing their representation.

Making sense of Taiwan’s foreign policy is so hard given their unique Schrödinger sovereignty status.