The 2 retirement reasons I've heard was that Ira stealth was compromised after the Kosovo shoot down (makes sense), and also that the introduction of the B-2 and F-22 having the ability to drop bombs retired it (also makes sense).

Not suggesting it be brought back. But out of curiosity, with the new generation of standoff weapons, would an F-117 using them (vs LGBs) today still be more effective in an environment with decent air defense vs a conventional plane today carrying the same weapons?

Kursk: The Epic Armored Engagement (2013)

25-30 minute lecture by Jon Parshall (of Shattered Sword fame) about the American, Russian, and German production method.

His biggest criticisms were that the Germans have not enough hard tools, too much design interference, too small production runs, and inefficient tooling process. There's that scene from the Battle of the Bulge where the German general says "show them that we make the finest toys in the world" - you think that boast is a caricature but it really isn’t. Speer only tried to simply things at the end but it was obviously too late.

I wonder if there’s an equivalent of young engineers/productions saying “I knew the production process was convoluted but no one listened to my suggestions”.

I understand how traditional 18th-19th battlefields worked, but most information I've found talks about open battle fields that where capable of letting soldiers form large squares.

Was there any standard tactics or procedures if for what ever reason a unit found itself in a pitched battle in a forest to thick to form proper squares, or if a unit had to subdue a resisting urban city when they can't just burn a house down. What are the historical examples of these situations.

While we are at it, I've read that Paris's urban renovations in the mid 19th century where designed to stop urban combat, but never go into detail how they did it.

Been curious about this for a while. I’ve always had the impression that helicopters were super effective against subs but have never understood why and in what way.

Is it just that they cannot be countered in the way that a surface ship can? Can a sub still hide from a helicopter? Would it even know that one is looking for it? Can a helicopter detect a sub in a way that a surface ship cannot?

Inspired by a recent comment on this subreddit by a serving Royal Australian Navy officer, I thought I'd brush up on my limited knowledge of early RAN actions - and what better way than to look into one of the first combat actions of Australia's then-fledgling naval force?

I remembered trying to tackle a book on the Emden when I was very young and being bored stiff. So now I'm much older and very boring myself, I thought I'd give the topic another tilt - and really didn't expect how interesting this book would be.

First Victory follows the incredible actions of the German commerce raider Emden in 1914, with a particular emphasis on the Australian forces that attempted to put her out of action. There have been a few accounts written about the Emden - including by several crew members - but First Victory seems to place particular emphasis on the Australian forces dispatched to sink her.

On going in I had a vague idea that the ship was very effective in its assigned role and that the captain and crew conducted themselves impeccably - but I had no idea how successful the Emden was.

Over the course of just a few months she captured over 24 vessels in an AO that spanned from India down to Indonesia, variously sinking and seizing vessels to assist their own operation. With limited supported from Germany, the Emden relied on stores and coal from merchant vessels she intercepted.

To give you an idea of the intensity of their action, on one occasion she seized 3(!) vessels in the space of a few hours. (The last of which was a dredger, barely seaworthy, being sailed from Scotland to Australia. The crew were actually relieved to be captured by the crew of the Emden and cheered when they holed her and sent her under).

There was a mild panic at the admiralty who, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, believed that Australian ships should be steamed from the pacific to the Atlantic to assist in operations there. As the Emden's tally grew they seemed increasingly concerned about the unprotected shipping lanes between Australia, India, Malaysia and the United Kingdom.

The development and crewing of the early Royal Australian Navy is covered in some detail, and their actions in the first months of the war - largely raiding small German outposts with a few men, smashing their wireless sets, having some schnapps with them and moving on. But their chief concern remained the Emden, which had pulled off a spectacular raid in Penang, where they sank a Russian cruiser and French destroyer before slipping away into the night, suffering no casualties.

(The raid made such an impression on the local population, many of whom fled the city, that the word Emden means a 'cunning or deceitful person' in Malaysian to this day).

Without spoiling the ending - actually I will, the Emden had seven shades of shit shot out of it by the Australians - the book does a fantastic job of ramping up the tension until it's final encounter with HMAS Sydney.

It also admirably described the horrors of a naval engagement, with little moments like the driving band of a shell being sheared off as the round deflected off a gunshield, with the band whipping through the air to gut a gunner really driving home how violent this kind of warfare can be.

All in all it's a great read, clearly written by an accomplished journalist able to recount a banger of a story and scattered with moments that verge on the boys on adventure. It still maintains a poignant end and does excellent service to the brave crews of both the Emden and the Sydney.

(Also taking recommendations for any other books about naval actions, with particular interest in the Royal Australian Navy).

I often ask about the difference between the two, their composition, their functions, and who has more authority over the other. I would greatly appreciate it if you could answer me.

Something I've noticed from watching lots of footage of the war in Ukraine is that grenades are responsible for most of the kills by the infantry. The rifles and machineguns are mostly just used to funnel the enemy into a spot where they can be killed by grenades or forced to surrender. Is this common amongst all wars or more a recent thing? I doubt it was as true in Vietnam, where a lot of people were likely killed by gunshots from behind thick grass. But I'm not too sure, which is why I'm enquiring.

I just finished reading Machiavell’s The Prince and I want to learn more about the time period he lived in

I am kind of struggling on how to phrase this question. sorry of its confusing

During WW2 was the 6 inch or 8 inch gun more practical for cruisers and why?

I have recently gotten into playing submarine simulators and I realized that it seems like allied submarines, especially US subs, are completely overshadowed in WWII compared to nations like Germany.

Why is this the case? From my limited research the US sunk 50% of the tonnage of the Germans with only 25% of the submarines. That seems extraordinary, and yet the majority of sub sims like Silent Hunter and U boat focus solely on German Uboats.

Is there a specific reason for this because of doctrine or something else?

Artillery can completely level buildings. How are defenses able to not just crumble as soon as there's prolonged shelling?

I am looking for highly detailed operational/staff maps from Operation Citadel (Kursk offensive, July 1943).

I am not looking for modern overview maps or simplified battle maps, but rather original German-style situation maps similar to those that could have been used by:

• OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres)
• Army Group South (Heeresgruppe Süd)

Does anyone know of online archives, books, scans, or collections where I could find these types of maps?

I am especially interested in maps close to the original staff documents rather than modern recreations.

If a company in country A buys a license to produce a product from a company in country B, and then countries A and B go to war, what is the legality of A continuing to produce that product if the license runs out? Obviously, if it's necessary for war production country A is going to see to it that it's still made, but are there any actual examples of this happening?

I know Rikuo (Japan) produced licensed Harley-Davidson motorcycles in the 30s that were used in WW2, but that license expired well before the war began. Are there any examples of licenses that lasted right until war broke out? Did the governments reissue them for identical products, or did the companies just do away with the legal fiction while continuing to manufacture the product?

Inspired from the multiple discussion about the necessity of the M10 Booker and other airdroppable/airmobile ground vehicle for direct gun support.

Some naysayers towards the unnecessity of a vehicle like the M10 Booker is that, as the United States, they have access to some of the largest aviation fleet in the world. So instead of utilizing precious cargo space aboard a C-17 or such for a niche armored vehicle, why not focus on the deployment of airborne infantry and their needed assets, while anything that can’t be taken care of with ease just eats JDAM, Hellfires, and JSOW ordnance from fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft, which would be present in some shape or form anyway to maintain air dominance to enable the airborne operation anyways.

I’m also thinking about this because, if my understanding of these airborne operation is clear, most of these operations are often attacking and holding strategic targets until the larger follow-up force arrives to relieve the airborne, hence even back with light armor with M551, M8, and M10, the idea of these vehicles were more to help augment the airborne forces right up until the heavier units like M1 Abrams make it to the theater to reinforce the airborne.

So since air supremacy is kinda needed to establish the airborne operation anyway, couldn’t the aviation unit be tasked to intensely support the ground strike support needs from the airborne force until ABCT and/or SBCT get to the airborne IBCT location to relieve them?

Or is there something fundamentally different and essential to a tank and its gun that aircraft cannot replace?

What is so special / diffrent about anti- ship missiles compared to regular ones?

Why can missille like the Russian Onyx still be used for land attack roles?

By hand cannons I'm talking tube on a stick (regarded as the first early firearm). In most works related to hand cannons they seem to be derided as woefully inaccurate, short ranged, and slow to reload weapons that had no change on late Medieval warfare apart from scaring enemy soldiers and being easy to train with. Of course this begs the question why anyone bothered to use this horribly made weapon at all especially considering it gives way to modern day firearms as we know it? Usually the counterpoint is the ease of training, but wouldn't crossbows fill that niche better than hand cannons (I've also read recently that apparently nobody even cited ease of training as an advantage for early firearms)? What value did various regions from China, Middle East, India, and Europe see the value in this weapon considering it's supposedly inferior to other ranged weapons such as bows and crossbows (until arquebuses/muskets were developed)?

Why didn't the Soviets/Russians ever converted the B-203/B-204 VLS (The ones that launch S-300Fs) into a universal launcher? Compared to the Mk 41, they have a similar length (assuming the length of the B-203 is 7-ish meter) and missile capacity.

Despite potentially cheaper convertiom cost to a possible universal variant, was the rotary nature of these VLSes made it so that it's cheaper to produce and maintain VLS like the 3S14 instead of using legacy VLSes? Or was it for other reasons?

Historically in the past, warriors tended to be elites as only they could afford the expense of obtaining weapons and a stead. In other cases, potential fighters were expected to equip themselves rather than the state, especially auxiliaries. And every once in a while in modern times, tribal groups/clans in certain countries with access to private firearms (legal or illegal) would issue calls to mobilization and threaten combat against rival groups if not state forces. Even during the Invasion of Ukraine, soldiers on both sides had to dip into their own pockets or get help from volunteers/donors to obtain things their armies failed to provide them be it drones, batteries, radios, etc. In many cases regarding Ukraine/Russia, private/volunteer channels to obtaining gear was said to work faster and more effectively than through the state, especially during the initial phase of drone adoption.

By modern standards of light infantry or drone operators at best, what can be expected if delegating equipment to individual recruits is how it is going to be due to circumstances? To approach NATO standards, how much money can an individual be expected to fork out and how realistic is it obtain the necessary gear through individual effort for a unit off-the-shelf?

IIRC the First Crusade (and all the other crusades as well) was less of a state-backed army and more of a ragtag group of religiously-motivated knights from across Europe that had to organize themselves on an ad hoc basis. How did they accomplish this in a way that didn’t lead to them collapsing or abandoning their main objective like the Fourth Crusade did?

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

So the text was written as an amendment, went through US Congress, gets ratified by the states of the time, and then… what happened next? Did it just mean the muskets and rifles in civilian homes are now assured safe? Or did the federal government with its militaries, or states and their militias/national guards enacted policies and procedures to make the most of the fact that the American civilian now has a protected right to “keep and bear arms”?

Basically, did anyone have concrete plan on how to integrate this right into military prowess and security? Or is it just an idea and law that everyone was free to make do with the new right?

After the Belgrano was torpedoed by HMS Conquerer, the entire Argentine navy returned to port as they were sitting ducks for the submarines.

Why did Argentina send their navy in the first place if they were so vulnerable? Did they think Britain wouldn't send them?

In Hunt for Red October, before the big briefing for the Chiefs of Staff, the Marine Corps Commandant compliments Jack Ryan for saving some British Royals in London (something that's expanded on in a later book). Ryan gets all humble and brushes it off saying he was just lucky, and the Comandant replies "Good officers are Lucky."

That's always stuck with me, but how do the fair residents of this sub view the Comandant's statement? I'm immediately thinking of quite how many good USN officers were unlucky (Fletcher, Hover, Scott), and how many officers were much luckier than they might have been good (Halsey, Callaghan, Wright)

Is this possible to integrate such missiles with ground based radars for example with AN/MPQ-53 or S-300's radar to said missiles to, for example shoot down Russian Su-34 ? If so why it was not implemented already in Ukraine yet?