(Sean's name, not mine)

Having already dealt blows to the hippie menace, the Shah now seeks to further stabilize his domestic security situation by further suppressing the threat posed to the Imperial State of Iran by dangerous narcotics and narcotic traffickers. He has directly authorized the armed forces to take all appropriate steps to deal with those responsible for the continued flow of illegal drugs to Iran and globally.

Make no mistake--there is no safe hiding place, no sanctuary from the righteous vengeance that Iran shall deal upon those whom immiserate the poor and vulnerable of the world with dependence to illicit substances. This false opium is nothing but an illusion of respite from the hard work required to build up our modern state and people, promoted by communist and socialist elements that aim to undermine the strong and ancient traditions of the noble Persians. Wherever these merchants of death go, the forces of justice will be close behind, and when they cry out for mercy--there will be none, for the only sentence promulgated for drug-running in Iran is the most ancient and fair one, meted out by the great Cyrus himself and his many descendants--that of death to he whom causes so much himself.

The press statement continues for several more paragraphs, becoming increasingly melodramatic. However, this excerpt aptly exhibits late Pahlavian policy and the Shah's increasing fixation on the matter of cultural-marxist subversion....

March 2, 1972

The condemnation of the UNTAM’s acceptance of South African food was quickly picked up on in Mauritania, especially by the elites that were backed by the South Africans. Quickly the news spread that the UN had intervened to cut off shipments of food from South Africa to the country, and while UNTAM was quick to add that this had not *yet* happened and that alternative food sources were being sourced to replace the lost food so that no Mauritanian would go hungry, this did little to soothe the anger of the more populist elements of Mauritania who decried the intervention of much of the world’s governments outside of Africa.

Portrayed as greedy, colonialist, and imperialistic outsiders who would rather opt to let starving Mauritanians drop dead in the streets than get African food to an African state (the whole truth of that skewed in reality in favor of the Mauritanian National Party, the new South African backed political movement in the country), the UNGA was quickly damned and taken for a traitorous organization.

In particular, the reputation of Libya and Syria, has suffered, damaging the political image of their pan-Arab supporters in the country. Yugoslavia was noted for it’s fair and even treatment of UNTAM despite its reservations about South Africa, and the USSR was heralded by CPM supporters for their offers to fully replace the food sent by South Africa, though this was tempered by the fact that this was a *potential future event* and not imminent, and the outrage that such a farce at the UNGA would even take place. Many called the proposed cutoff of South African food as a “blockade”. Few knew or cared about the sins of Apartheid.

Almost paradoxically, this has increased the confidence in the UNTAM of the people of Mauritania, which consistently defended its decision to feed the people of Mauritania at all costs, despite being an organ of the UN. UN peacekeepers themselves have seen impromptu acts of charity bestowed upon them, increased cooperation from the local population, and the view of nations manning the mission such as Ghana, Ireland, and Sweden has increased as a result due to their positive presence in the country’s stability.

The UNGA “tribunal”, as it was mockingly called, reinforced South Africa’s image in Mauritania, and also led to the positive increase in interest about South African associated states such as Rhodesia and “the Congo”. As there were two Congos this did lead to some confusion among lesser educated members of the populace, and so interest in both was piqued. This food debacle also has had no effect on the now-entrenching South African business forces within the country opening mining interests and offering new jobs to native Mauritanians as operations begin to get underway, along with rumored “private security” for those businesses to “protect against Moroccan banditry”. Also positively received by Mauritanians were the both United States and the Dominican Republic: each nation was hailed for their defense of the Mauritanian people’s struggle and their defense of UNTAM’s administration. Business interests have begun to reach out to these countries as well.

While the slap on the wrist to UNTAM (and more largely public admonishment of South African food politics) may have accomplished a very short term political win, it has effectively flipped Mauritanian politics away from pan-Arab interests and countries and UN-centric diplomacy, and towards other political ideologies.

———————

META

The popularity of Pan-Arab parties, and viewpoint of Libya and Syria in particular, has suffered.

The CPM-S and CPM-T see a minor boost in support.

The Dominican Republic, South Africa + friends, and the United States all see rising popularity in Mauritania, as well as the major countries in the UN Peacekeeping mission (Ghana, Ireland, Sweden).

Zhongnanhai, Beijing, China

January 17th, 9:43PM

From the desk of Chairman Mao, approved by the Emergency Central Committee of the People’s Republic of China 

Notice to all Red Guard field offices: Attached find order 66 as issued by the Chairman and his advisors. All state armories to be managed by the RCMDRG, handover to be complete by 2:00 AM local time. PLA forces to stand down, refusal to cooperate is treason. Glory to the people, and glory to the revolution. 

Guangzhou, China

January 18th, 1972, 1:43AM local time 

Liu Jun stepped outside of the Guangzhou office of the People’s Armed Department, a lit cigarette in one hand and room temperature glass of beer - some unremarkable Soviet brand - in the other. As usual, Liu Jun would be the only one on watch tonight, a one-man skeleton crew primarily in charge of making sure no one accessed the PADs armory without proper authority. While many of his colleagues despised the role, Liu did not mind - the job was simple, boring, and kept him far away from the fight in Vietnam - much to his and his wife’s relief. 

Truthfully, Liu Jun was mostly glad he didn’t need to interact with the locals in this position. Raised in Inner Mongolia, he found the local militia men his unit was tasked with training rough, and much like his father had instilled in him - slow and untrustworthy. He felt it in their eyes when he had the misfortune of training them. He couldn’t stand them. Sipping the last of his beer, a pair of headlights came into view, slowly approaching the gates of the Guangzhou PAD Armory, and Liu Jun sighed “Another overnight shipment? These guys are clowns” he thought. Reaching for his keys, Liu Jun took his time approaching the gate, puffing his cigarette and intent on demonstrating his disdain by approaching as slowly as possible. As he approached, Liu Jun saw three more sets of headlights approaching from a distance. Annoyed, Liu began muttering to himself: “Four trucks? These fucks better not think I’m helping them unload these boxe-“ 

BANG

Liu Jun felt a sharp pain, stumbled for a moment, and then collapsed, his neck gushing rivers of blood as men began to pour out of the truck. As he struggled for air, in his last moments Liu Jun could only watch as three young men - no older than 20 each picked him up, and flung him out of the way of the oncoming traffic. As his vision faded, his eyes focused on the reflective red bands worn by his assailants, helpless to resist as his murderers searched his clothes for keys, took his watch, and stepped over him into the armory. 

The eruption of a full-scale war in the Levant was perhaps one of the least surprising events of 1971. The conflict had hardly been kept very secret, even if the final jumping-off date was protected. As early as 1968 Iranian leadership and their informants had reason to suspect this might occur in the near future (just ask the people responsible for ordering a series of shoddy British supertankers). That being said, geopolitical consequences aside, it was not entirely without its lessons.

Generally speaking, what the Iranian General Staff, Ministry of Defense, and the Shah himself--who had very keenly followed the war, mostly via the BBC World Service, which had shown itself faster than dispatches from the Foreign Ministry or the various delegations and attaches and hangers-on in Tehran--saw pleased them. Qualitatively, the Arabs were clearly far inferior to the Israelis in their performance.

Airpower had proven just as effective as the Shah expected, given current military literature. In fact, recent innovations had, in fact, made it more deadly--particularly the development of cluster submunitions in the form of the "Rockeye" bomb, although the Shah himself was more keen on the imminent introduction of the "Maverick" missile. Air combat reports remained fuzzy, but there was nothing to suggest that the American-influenced doctrine of the IIAF was particularly erroneous, although there seemed to be some difficulty in engaging the MiG-21s of the Arabs due to simple kinematics. The next generation of fighters seemed much more hopeful on that prospect anyways, and with validation of missile improvements, these maneuvering characteristics were becoming less relevant anyways. There were a few troubling things though--losses due to ground fire increased, and, to be fair, it seemed that integrating anti-air capabilities in frontline units was going to become more important in the future, especially given the potential of rotary attack aviation--one thing relatively untested in this war. The M167 Vulcan, while not totally ineffective, was clearly insufficient, too--the Shah made a note of that. Probably the solution was just 35mm Oerlikon, but he didn't know for sure yet. For that matter, surface to air missiles had shown a surprising amount of use during the war--but mainly as point-defense rather than broad area-coverage systems. There might be some need for those, especially given the... difficult topography of Iran. The efficacy of Soviet systems, too, also seemed to have improved--but not too much to be done about that besides buying new American electronics.

Land warfare had proven interesting, though relatively predictable. The T-55 and T-62 largely failed to impress, although that might come down to their Egyptian crews--the M60's superior rotation speed and fire control generally allowed it, in the hands of good crews, to get an advantage over its Soviet peers. More notably, the deployment of anti-tank missiles by both sides seemed to generally be showing great success. Given the inability of tanks to defend effectively against ATGMs, this suggested that the utility of armor was diminished, though not absent--and more importantly, that heavy investment in relatively inexpensive infantry-ATGM teams was probably quite worthwhile, especially when considering a Soviet scenario. The deployment of the BMP-1, on the other hand, suggested that the infantry fighting vehicle concept was probably worth investigating (although the 73mm cannon seemed grossly ineffective). Of other note, the deployment of rocket artillery, particularly long ranged rocket artillery, had been quite effective for suppressing artillery and air defense sites as well as preparing assault bombardments--a capability that Iran currently lacked but could, the Shah figured, stand to invest in.

The naval theater was the most frustrating--there was no clear indication as to what a successful defense against anti-ship missiles would look like. Surface fleets, evidently, were not a particularly useful thing to invest in--beyond what was required for maritime patrol and anti-submarine operations. Submarines and aircraft would obviously remain the primary tools of naval combat. Iran itself lacked anti-ship missiles, although this was not a particularly urgent problem given the lack of a meaningful enemy navy--besides hypothetical Soviet nuclear submarines in the Gulf of Oman. On the whole, this problem was probably best left to the Americans--there was simply no realistic route to getting nuclear submarines, and aircraft carriers were, the Shah suspected, more trouble than they were worth, although he didn't rule out the possibility of acquiring one entirely.

The Shah also felt very smug about correctly assessing ballistic missiles as being essentially useless weapons--they had proven so in Yugoslavia, and in Korea, and in Vietnam, so it was no surprise they were proving quite unhelpful here too. Without a nuclear weapon, they were simply too inaccurate and sparse to generate effects--nothing like what airpower could deliver. Still, having some sort of missile program was going to eventually be necessary to support... special payloads. The Shah made a note of that. They'd want to start doing something in that area soon, if they wanted to build the requisite expertise.

With all that said and done--notebook full of scribbles in one hand, and newfound massive oil revenues in the other, the Shah set out once again to tweak his precious armed forces.

February, 1972 Every-town, Rhodesia

“It’s as Rhodesian as Fish and Chips.” The salesman gave a jaundiced smile. “One television is fine, of course, for the family. But what about mom and dad? What’s better than having a television in the bedroom? The kids won’t bother you.”

“It’s a bit… decadent, don’t you think?” Christina looked at her husband expectantly. “We have the black and white one for our bedroom already…”

“We’ve earned it. Don’t you think? Better for watching baseball.” Thomas had a mad look in his eyes, which he only seemed to get when there was the option to buy something new. Christina suddenly thought, when was the last time he didn't have that look about him? It had been years.

Their little farm had gone from a nest egg to an honest-to-goodness business. Once Tom had convinced some of their neighbors to pool their machinery and make a deal with a shady South African smuggler (Who Christina was convinced dealt drugs, as she was increasingly convinced everyone was a drug dealer, a satanist, a communist, or all three at once), which netted them an unthinkable income. Some of that went back into the farm, more machinery, more land, more hired labor.

But most of it went into endless renovations and expansions of their little farmhouse. Now increasingly it was what was being termed in the press a “Rhodie Mansion,” The ostentatious and kitschy homes of the new food barons of Rhodesia.

The government has heavily promoted the cultivation of food crops for export in the past 2 years, replacing cash crops which have been much harder to move in light of continuing sanctions from the International Communist Conspiracy United Nations.

Always a productive agricultural area, Rhodesia has suddenly become a lynchpin of the global economy. One of the only places on earth with a surplus not only of staple grains and fruit, but of pork and beef. Rhodesians, perhaps inspired by their televisual obsession, have taken to wearing cowboy hats and carrying revolvers on their hips. The new cowboys come from Bulawayo, not Oklahoma.

In 1970, there were 50,000 Televisions in Rhodesia, roughly ten times the per capita rate of television ownership in the rest of Africa. Now there were almost 300,000. More Televisions than white people.

Being flush with cash, in particular foreign cash, does that. While officially still struggling under sanctions, the global food crisis has injected large amounts of money into Rhodesia. Much of this has come in through South African and Portuguese intermediaries, while Scientology-operated farms in the Americas are suddenly almost impossibly productive.

Buyers look the other way. Why wouldn’t they? What good are “principles” and “morality” when the only other option is to starve?

That money, however, doesn’t stay in Rhodesia. It becomes cheap consumer goods. Microwave Ovens, Cars, Refrigerators, and, above all, color TV. The ultimate symbol of settler affluence. A home with giant, expensive box TVs in every room.

The government, suddenly awash with cash as well, has taken to promoting large-scale immigration initiatives. Most of these have been unsuccessful, only attracting the most marginal Southern European peasants, much to the chagrin of the xenophobic Rhodesian settler class. Thankfully, they have all the inane and saccharine television programming they could ever want to distract them.

If you just ignore 95% of the population, life in Rhodesia has never been better. Farms hire more and more laborers, money keeps moving in. Lives get better and better. People watch more and more television and sink into the comfortable paranoid fascism of the mansion class.

On the advice of Omar al-Meheshi, the Libyan government in December 1971 hired a group of French professional services advisors to travel to Libya, to give them above all the necessary European advice of business. Libya had been well-endowed with the gift of oil wealth, but Omar al-Meheshi was intent on securing Libya’s development and wealth permanently.

The RCC mandated the creation of the Istithmar Corporation in December of 1971, wholly owned by the government of the Libyan Arab Republic, capitalized through the revenues of Libya’s similarly state-owned National Oil Corporation. Istithmar is to act as a long-time funding asset for Libya, accumulating capital from the sale of oil by Libya, as well as to act as it’s capital arm in terms of foreign investment. Istithmar is encouraged to create various subsidiary companies in various wealthy countries, particularly the United States, France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Britain. Not only would the focus be to purchase real estate properties, but also to invest in whatever could assist Libya or Libya’s image.

Gaddafi had always been a sports fan, and nothing more could improve Libya’s image to the world than owning a sports team. The recently-created American subsidiary Istithmar Investment Corporation began searching, and found that the National Basketball Association’s Boston Celtics was owned by the failing Ballantine Brewing Corporation. Ballantine Brewing had declined and wished to sell the brand and its assets elsewhere. Businessmen Irv Levin and Harold Lipton had been aiming to purchase the Celtics, but with rumors that the NBA would be likely to deny their offer due to Levin’s ties with the owners of the Seattle SuperSonics, Istithmar Investments swooped in with an offer of $4.3 million dollars, more than what Levin, Lipton, or any other prospective buyers could offer. Ballantine accepted the offer, and the NBA subsequently approved, selling the Boston Celtics to the Istithmar Investment Corporation on February 19, 1972.

As the corporation was being set up, Libya naturally aimed to find an Arab-American who would be sympathetic enough to Libya to be willing to run a Libyan subsidiary, while at the same time American enough to get buy in the business world. They found t he perfect candidate. Najeeb Halaby, President and CEO of Pan Am, had already planned to issue his resignation from Pan Am during the year in any case, and when contacted by Libyan businessmen, he agreed to resign early from Pan Am and take the job as CEO at Istithmar Investment Corporation. Halaby, who had also served as Director of the FAA under the Jackson administration, was a clearly well-respected figure in the American business world. Halaby successfully got the support of the Boston Celtics’ President and General Manager Red Auerbach, who assured him that Libya’s anti-Zionist policy would not result in Auerbach losing his job.

Beijing, China

January 17th, 1972 - 6:00PM

The emergency session of the Central Committee had simmered for hours with no clear disclosure - rumors abounded on the status of the Chairman, whilst elsewhere members of the committee demanded an end for to military lockdown of Beijing. After several hours of no news, no food, and being locked in the chambers by what seemed to be an army of Red Guard fanatics, the Central Committee had reached a boiling point, the rise in tension exploding when Li Fuchun - a long time ally of Zhou Enlai struck a red guard member after being denied the right to leave the chambers. First fights arose between the various factions of the Central Committee, then, on Song Yaowu’s orders, the battle became one sided as Red Guards took to beating the committee members with the butts of their rifles, restoring order and leaving several men of the committee with broken, bloody noses. 

As order was restored, the doors swung open, with the last member of the “Gang of Four” - Jiang Qing - the chairman’s wife, entering the room. Silence fell over the Chamber - as those in attendance watched Jiang Qing slowly work her way to the front podium, clutching a crumbled sheet of paper in her hands. 

Jiang Qing unrolled her paper, dabbed her eyes dry, and began to robotically read off the sheet before her:

“Comrades, as you must know by now, the Chairman has fallen ill. At this time, the Chairman remains alive but unresponsive. The doctors believe that it will be long before my husband, and the Supreme Leader of China can return to his duties. 

In my hands, I hold the Chairman’s official set of orders and procedures in the event of his incapacitation, beginning with a brief quote from the Chairman to guide us in this hour of uncertainty: ‘Be swift, be absolute, and show no hesitation’.

With this Comrades, I announce that Song Yaowu, daughter of the Revolution, leader of the Red Guard and hero of the party is to henceforth operate as the Chairman’s stand-in. From here, until the Chairman and her’s death, her word is law, just as the Chairman’s was.”

The chamber of Zhongnanhai erupted.

“You don’t have this power!” Cried out a defiant member of the committee.

“What have you done to the Chairman!?” Shouted another.

While some cheered for Song Yaowu as she took the stage, a vocal component of the room continued to jeer and protest. Song Yaowu ignored them as she swapped places with Jiang Qing - who stood behind Song flanked by Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan. 

Song Yaowu smiled eerily as her eyes scanned the room in silence, her eye contact making several members of the committee uncomfortable enough to squirm in their seats as one by one her detractors fell silent.

“Thank you all for your rapid response in this time of crisis. Before I began, I would like to request that the guests outside be allowed in.” Said Song, motioning to several of her guards by the main chamber entrance. Gently propping open the doors, Song’s men gave way to a seemingly endless stream of armed men and women, dressed in grey fatigues and adorned with Red Arm bands, each armed with SKS rifles, and in one case, an RPG. The Central Committee members watched in terror, the color draining from their faces as more and more young fanatics streamed into the room.

Song Yaowu smiled once more before continuing:

“When I call your name, please come to the stage and stand where instructed. Your cooperation is greatly appreciated my comrades.”

Song Yaowu chuckled as she unrolled a dingy looking scroll, and beamed with excitement as she read the first name: “Deng Xiaoping”. And then more: “Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying.” She continued. One by one, the men slowly made their way to the stage, with some - such as Bo Yibo and He Long having to be forcibly restrained and carried to the stage after their refusal. 

Song Yaowu called 29 names, most notably:
Deng Xiaoping

Peng Zhen

Chen Yun

He Long

Ye Jianying

Bo Yibo

Li Fuchun

Li Xiannian 

Chen Yi

Qiao Guanhua

Huang Hua

Wang Bingnan

One by one, the men were escorted on stage, blindfolded, gagged, bound, and lined up side by side. After calling the last name, Song Yaowu looked giddy - carrying unmatched excitement as she watched the last man be set into place. Tossing her list aside, she turned her attention back to the Central Committee:

“Comrades, the men before you have been the subjects of a years-long probe by the intelligence service of the Red Guard security forces, assisted and vetted by trusted members of the Ministry of Public Security. 

Over the last year, these men have all been documented committing extensive crimes against Chinese interests. They have met with foreign diplomats in secret. Traded in opium. Accepted bribes. And worst of all, conspired against the Chairman. Today, they have gone a step too far, harming the health of our Chairman with their ill intent.

Today, we bring these revisionist dogs to justice. With the powers entrusted to me by Comrade Chairman Mao, I sentence these men to immediate execution. May this serve as a warning for all who intend to betray our cause.”

The Central Committee erupted, with several demanding an end to the madness. Then came the gunfire. The room fell silent in horror, as despite their protests, Wang Hongwen proceeded with the executions without hesitation, meticulously swaying his Kalashnikov from one prisoner to the next. 28 rounds later, Deng Xiaoping remained the last man standing as Wang’s rifle jammed. He tossed the rifle aside, drew his Makarov, and emptied the clip into Deng’s chest. 

Not long after, the Red Guards that had flooded the chamber began to make arrests. Any members of the committee who spoke up against the Gang of Four on this day were to be tried by revolutionary committee. Chairman Mao remained unconscious at Beijing hospital, and the Gang of Four tightened their grip in his name.
 

The Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia, desiring to strengthen friendly relations and establish a durable framework for mutually beneficial cooperation, hereby agree to the following:

——————

Article I — Free Trade and Transit Agreement

1. Brazil shall establish a Export Processing Zone (Zona de Processamento de Exportação) in Corumbá, where export and import oriented companies can be established with specific tributary, currency exchange and administrative treatment from the government in order to promote trade with Bolivia.
2. Bolivian and Brazilian imports to each other shall not be taxed by either, respecting the principles of free trade
3. Trade between the two countries shall be done via their respective currencies, without any other foreign mean of exchange as intermediary

Article II — Infrastructure Connection and Colaboration

1. The Brazilian government will help with the construction of a railway connection between Cochabamba, Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Corumbá, connecting with the already existing Western Corridor railway and Southern Mineral Line.
2. - This will be done through a cruzeiro denominated loan according to a joint comission study on the cost and financial viability of the project. New loans will be realized if the original financing stream power is excessively reduced by brazilian inflation.
3. - Brazilian construction companies shall be contracted by Bolivia for the project. Local workforce is to be used when possible.
4. Bolivian commodity exports will be allowed to flow via the new railway connection, being authorized to ship globally from the Porto do Rio Grande, located in Porto Alegre, being subject to the same toll payments as brazilian companies using the line.

Article III — Oil and Gas Trade and Cooperation

1. Bolivia shall supply oil and natural gas to Brazil via railway transit, in quantities to be defined by a joint industrial and trade comission. As under Article I, these exports are to be paid in cruzeiros, but in prices bianually revised by the comission.
2. PETROBRAS and the bolivian YPFB will collaborate on technical development matters, and will welcome a bolivian and a brazilian mission respectively for technological interchange
3. The viability of joint investments in bolivian oil and gas extraction will be studied by a technical comission from both companies

Article IV — Mining Cooperation

1. Vale do Rio Doce and Bolivian COMIBOL will collaborate on technical development matters, and will qelcome a bolivian and a brazilian mission respectively for technological interchange
   
2. The viability of joint investments in bolivian mineral extraction will be studied by a technical comission from both companies

After losses taken in a boondoggle in Zanzibar, the PCSC has engaged in a new recruitment drive overseas to bring in experienced and trained combat soldiers into the company. The efforts have had, to say the least, mixed success.

Around 140 Colombians and Indonesians signed contracts into the company. A little more than 100 or so former FFL and OAS Frenchmen. 240 or so Venezuelans signed came on board. A larger swath of Panamanians, familiar with the DR and its military through cooperation earlier in the decade, signed up at a solid 400 men. Signing up discharged veterans of the DR's own former servicemen, brought the total up to around 1,200 men total.

The PCSC now totals about 4,400 'contractors' in total. More likely than not to see action soon enough given the demand for their services across the globe.

It has also seen a license from the government to purchase surplus arms from the DR government, as well as a recent purchase of around 200 Toyota Landcruiser ‘Sport Utility Station Wagons’, 300 Land Cruisers akin to jeeps, and a handful of light civilian aircraft.

January 12 - February 15, 1972

The Bolivian National Development Council

The remaining months of 1971 following Banzer taking the Presidency had been dedicated mostly to securing control of the country and uprooting the supporters of Torres. January of 1972 would give President Banzer and the Nationalist Popular Front their first opportunity to run the country as they choose.

On January 12th the government would announce the creation of a new National Development council following a few conversations brief conversations between Hugo Banzer and lobbyists. This new council will serve as an advisory body, made up of industrialists or their representatives, economists and academics. Together they are to help guide the government and their economic policies so as to encourage growth and efficiency. Mining magnate Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada is to receive the honour of being appointed as the first head of the council, reflecting his rising importance.

The War on The Central Obrera Boliviana

The first issue that the Bolivian National Development Council would speak on is that of organized labour. It is no secret that the mining industry has been a hotbed of radicalism and violence. The council would place the blame for this on the Central Obrera Boliviana and its leadership who they accuse of "coopting" organized labour for the purposes of waging economic warfare. This was to play an important role in General Juan José Torres conspiracy to install Socialism on the Bolivian people.

Though most present would prefer to make organized labour and the right to strike in its entirety illegal, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada helped lead the conversation to a tamer approach.

The following measures would be proposed to President Banzer and his administration by the Bolivian National Development Council:

• The Central Obrera Boliviana and its leader Juan Lechín are to be declared to have aided the previous Socialist Administration. No longer can this organization be allowed to operate legally in Bolivia, its recognition as an official labour union should be revoked. These bans should be justified as the organization having failed to uphold its duty to act in the best interests of its members and instead acting merely to push the political goals of its leadership.

• New state controlled unions are to be created instead to represent the people.These are to be led by state appointed figures with priority being given to those with ties to the military or industrialists so as to ensure loyalists are in charge. These organizations are to be split into multiple branches representing different branches and mines. Additionally, in order for these organizations to engage in a legal strike a vote must be held within each branch. This is to be justified as providing better representation to its members and ensuring greater accountability. The true purpose of these tools will help diminish cross business and industry solidarity, while also providing an opportunity for business leaders to bribe or coerce workers in order to avoid a strike. An initial restraint will also be applied, in order for a strike to be recognized as legal unions will be required to prove they have at least attempted mediation with the company beforehand. These new measures are to be played off as fulfilling the vision of our political allies, the Bolivian Socialist Falange's labour policy. This should help maintain stability within our alliance, pleasing the FSB and avoiding angering the MNR. It also gives an easy target to help redirect potential anger from this policy towards.

• Corporations should be given the ability to call upon the military or police to aid them in containing strikes should they act outside the boundaries of the law or engage in violence.

The hope is that these new measures will allow for the Bolivian economy and especially the mining industry to work far more efficiently and to put an end to the troublesome Central Obrera Boliviana which has already pushed leftism onto the nation for far too long. The government would adopt these measures shortly after their proposal on February 15, 1972. No longer will Bolivia be subjected to economic terrorism from socialist infiltrated labour organizations.

January 1972

The Yugoslav government announced today that, after approval from the British government, Libya will be the first foreign recipient of the Yugoslav-manufactured Orao jet. The first of 45 mainline variant Oraos will be delivered circa 1978.

The sale is for an undisclosed sum of money.

February 1, 1972

While the UNTAM and largely western-backed forces represented the center of the country (with pro-UK, US, and France leanings), and the right wing was split between both 1) the Islamists representing the core traditional values of Arab culture and Islam in the place of government (many sympathetic to overtures from Libya and Iraq, and not including the alleged Moroccan fifth columnists that anti-Moroccan elements claimed were causing instability) and 2) the portion of the Bediane community aligning itself with South Africa inspired by the racial politics in that state and the desire to make a new Mauritania in their image, another political force had been hard at work in Mauritania the last few years: and that was the communists.

It was no secret that the Soviets had been working hard to capture the hearts and minds of the third world, especially in Africa, but Mauritania represented a unique case as it was governed by the UN. The fantastical offers of aid and the Soviet’s desires to make countries into Stalinist utopias with legions of military construction workers wasn’t an offer that could be made to the UNTAM due to the fact that it was both already fully funded by the UN and that it was more of a custodian trying to rebuild the nation than a political actor. But the Soviets had recently repatriated several hundred Mauritanian citizens to the country. Having been abroad during the Moroccan invasion, these men and women had learned all that the Soviet Union had to offer. And in their eyes, they had never witnessed such glory in the great constructions of the Soviet Union.

Upon their return, they would begin to organize a new Communist Party and prepare their fellow citizens for the world to come. With the assistance of Communists returning from Algeria who had already tasted their own revolution, the Communist Party - Mauritania was no less full of zeal. Influential in the selection of students and families that were going to be sent to the Soviet Union as a part of the UNTAM political trainings program, the Communist Party of the country also began to send people across the border to Algeria to make contacts with their brothers in that country despite the risks of violence due to the civil war there. Rumors were abound that CPM was also starting to source weaponry to make militias to defend itself, or for the purposes of wreaking havoc on Mauritania in a revolutionary wave. No one could say for certain. But it was obvious that the CPM was, at least for the time being, here to stay.

But the USSR-Algeria bloc wasn’t the only bloc of the Communists. A smaller element of the bloc were Titoists that had been able to visit Yugoslavia and found it a more palatable alternative to the Stalinism of the Soviet union. Indeed, there were a number of left-wing sympathizers that were more keen on the Non-Aligned Movement rather than being beholden to any superpower and thus sought a CPM that reflected the values of Titoist Yugoslavia and the NAM, encouraging their families and friends to visit that country and join their movement.

As the joke goes, the leftists tend to enjoy fracturing their movements, and the CPM was no exception. Although the two wings attempted to reconcile their differences, rapprochement was impossible. The Stalin-Tito split had caused irreparable damage between the two leaders and viewpoints, and this quickly split the CPM into the larger Stalinist wing (CPM-S) and the smaller but robust Titoist wing (CPM-T). The CPM-T was also not going to take the rumors of CPM-S weaponry and militias idly, so they began to do the same thing. And in porous-bordered Mauritania, it was quite easy for these non-state actors to get some weapons from places such as Niger or across the border with Algeria.

Thus, left-leaning Mauritania was doomed to repeat the Communist split in a microcosm form, with villages and their gangs of militias seizing control and influence while going out and trying to convert others to their cause. Although there was no shooting war yet between the wings of the CPM, the fear was there that it could happen. And it remained to be seen if outside actors would influence that trajectory.

October 4th, 1971

Morocco's fleet of Vantour bombers, with their long-range endurance ability, will depart for Libya. They aim to bring the destruction they once brought to Nouakchott to the Zionist Entity. The North African members of the Arab League recently agreed to permit travel, so that Arab nations far from Palestine can still contribute to the righteous struggle. We will strike a blow against the heart of the enemy, and break their will to fight on.

I need to make sure they do not fuck up the money and the COMECON during the crucial period of the oil shock, during which time OGAS will be coming online. I will declaim as soon as I make sure that no one has fucked up the money again.

Beijing, China

January 17th, 1972

10:01 AM: 

“This is Song Yaowu from the Chairman’s office - send Dr. Li Zhisui immediately and lock down Zhongnanhai.”

10:15 AM

Several trucks filled with local armed members of the Red Guards began to fill the streets surround Zhongnanhai, whilst local police were ordered to clear a path directly to Beijing Hospital. 

10:23 AM 

Wang Hongwen arrives at Zhongnanhai with a further three trucks of Red Guards, and confirms that the Hebei red guards are en route to Beijing.

10:27 AM

An ambulance is seen departing Zhongnanhai.

11:06 AM

The first Hebei Province Red Guards arrive to Beijing; by now, most civilians have been ordered to shelter in place and the city grinds to a halt.

11:15 AM

Zhongnanhai, Beijing Hospital, and a connective route between both have been entirely locked down by a mix of local police and Red Guard members.

12:03 PM

The Central Committee gathers in Zhongnanhai.

3:45 PM

The Central Committee receives word that the Chairman has suffered a stroke. All members of the Central Committee are to remain monitored by Red Guards until the Chairman’s treatment is complete.

4:42 PM:

Red Guards have established checkpoints across all of Beijing, while foreign diplomats have been advised to remain indoors by the PLA Diplomatic Protection Task Force.

January 1972

Since the restoration of democracy, Brazil has repeatedly faced episodes of high inflation. Balance of payment problems associated with its pro-cyclical behavior being the most common offender, hightened by aggressive investment needing capital good imports and constant public deficits. With time, economic policy has somewhat reduced foreign dependency, with a higher percentage of capital and consumer goods locally produced. This has shown itself to not be enough however, as shocks to the price of oil and food now lead to significant upheavels in the global economy.

Starting in 1970, but intensifying in late 1971, inflation rose in the country. At first food prices reduced real wages, and attempts to preserve it augmented production costs. Then, the 70% increase on the international price of oil led to higher energy costs and increases in prices across the globe, imported to the brazilian economy via trade. The usual culprit was the last to strike, but was also the hardest. The higher import costs, both in general goods but especially in oil and oil derivatives, are already dramatically increasing the country's current account deficit, and in continuation of the managed crawling exchange-rate mechanism adopted since 1967 the cruzeiro steadily and not so slowly loses value against the dollar, seriously compouding the previous inflationary pressures.

——

As a sort of stopgap, the first measure taken by the government is to cede to the industrial groups pressure. Those, who since Adhemar's last months tried hard to convince him of abandoning pushes for real wage increases, finally got what they wanted. According to them, the previous arrangement may have some fairness to it, but rendered brazilian industrial exports uncompetitive at a stage of still lower productivity compared to dominant manufacturing powerhouses, and was actively harming economic development. As a supposedly temporary measure, sectoral wage frameworks will be renegotiated with industrial federations and other major employers so that increases will not fully accompany productivity gains for the next years, and for 1972 and 1973 will only amount to accumulated inflation. The express goal being reducing production costs inflation and, more importantly, increasing or preserving (mainly industrial) export competitiveness in an attempt to stabilize the country's balance of payment.

Such measures of course bring much criticism from trade unions and the working class as a whole, something echoed by Minister of Labour Juvenal de Lino Matos, aiming to increase his popularity in detriment of the president and eventually gain control of the party. To give at least some sort of guarantee for these groups, the new framework expects that productivity gains will be progressively included back into readjustments, at a factor of 0.5 and then 1 in 1974 and 1975 onwards respectively. Critics continue to argue, as the annual readjustments leave 11 months of significantly reduced real spending power, and even try to reason about the effects of contracting internal consumption on economic growth. All their arguments however seem to fall on deaf ears, as advised by Finance Minister Delfim Netto and his export oriented line of policy, president Garcez privately maintains that this is a difficult time, and “alguém tem que pagar o pato”. Industrialists interests, those dearest to the president, shall be protected, as even if in a contracting consumer market a devalued cruzeiro is expected to open the way for maintaining the process of import substitution.

Zhongnanhai, People’s Republic of China 

Mao reached into his pocket and retrieved his Zhongnanhai cigarettes, grabbing one in his mouth before reaching for his matches. Clumsily, the chairman snatched the package, noticing his arm had fallen asleep, he switched hands, struck the match, and took a deep drag of his first cigarette in hours - letting the sweet relief of nicotine wash over his nerves. Pulling too quickly, the rough smoke singed the chairman’s throat, sending him into one of his now all too frequent coughing fits. The Chairman reached for his water, and sipped at the glass before cursing in frustration as a stream of water flowed out of the corner of his mouth, onto his pants, giving the appearance of urine stained trousers. 

Standing to pat himself dry, the Chairman immediately collapsed as his right leg unexpectedly felt numb, causing him to lose balance and collapse onto the floor. Outside, two guards glanced at each other momentarily after the thud, before being called to attention by none other than Song Yaowu, who marched down the hall flanked by a posse of Red Guards. Saluting, the Chairman’s guards stepped away for their usual smoke break as the Red Guards took their places and Song Yaowu let herself into the Chairman’s office for their usual 10 am meeting. Song Yaowu froze. The chairman’s seat was empty. “Did he cancel and not tell me?” She thought, pacing up to the desk curiously, setting down the thick manila folder in her hand - a list of proposed purges for the year’s end. Song Yaowu froze. The chairman lay on his back, gasping for air, just behind his desk, blood spewing from his head after an apparent fall. Snapping back to reality, Song noticed the chairman feebly raising his left hand for aide, and snapped into action - grabbing her phone and dialing a short 3 digit number which was answered immediately.

“Comrade Hongwen, this is Song Yaowu from the Chairman’s office - send Dr. Li Zhisui immediately and lock down Zhongnanhai.”

January 12, 1972

As a part of its plans to expand the small Mauritanian military, a couple dozen students are traveling to the United States to be trained on fighter aircraft and weapons systems. The UNTAM felt that, naturally, the United States Air Force was the first and truly best option out of the many air forces due to its industrial capabilities, advanced technology, and proven Air Force.

After a brief meeting with the UNTAM, the delegation of the United States agreed to host the new cadets. The lesson of Nouakchott had been clear: control of the skies was key to the defense of Mauritania. It was in the best interest of the UN and Mauritania that the country was able to defend itself against foreign aerial aggression.

This would be a fairly lengthy undertaking, however, and requires roughly 6-7 years for fully combat capable pilots to be trained, so this would prove one of the longest programs for military retraining and expansion that the UNTAM would begin and, hopefully, a civilian government would be able to finish.

January 21, 1972

Talks with France commenced after the successful training of a Mauritanian ground force in order to procure a small naval force to defend the coast of Mauritania. There were a number of reasons why France made a good candidate for such a mission, including the familiarity with French weapons systems and the prevalence of the French language, but most attractive of all were the Sa'ar class missile boats sitting in French stores that had not been delivered to their intended purchaser, and were likely never going to be delivered.

Instead, the UNTAM arranged for a new Mauritanian navy to be built starting with two of these small vessels. They only required a crew of several dozen sailors to operate and would more than suffice as patrol vessels and coast guard ships for the Mauritanian military. However, they had teeth, with half-a-dozen SSM batteries, air surface & surveillance radar, and fire control radar. These were also fairly modern, having been constructed in the late 1960s.

Under the Mauritanian Navy, these two vessels would be called the "Chinguetti-class" Missile Boats, with minor modifications made to them so that the vessels would meet Mauritanian needs. Training would be expected to take place across 18 months in the southern coast of France, and during the last 6 months a small compliment of Marines for the navy would also be trained.

France, of course, was keen to assist Mauritania in order to protect its hegemony over Françafrique, so talks progressed smoothly between the UNTAM/Mauritanian military and the French government.

To assist the rightful Peruvian government in its efforts against the communists, the Dominican government is deploying elements of the Dominican National Air Force to the Peruvian government to provide modern air support. The following are sent:

• 10 F-100 Super Sabre Fighter-Bombers
• 8 A-1 Skyraider Attack Aircraft
• 2 Martin B-57 Canberra Jet Bombers
• 2 AH-1 Cobra Attack Helicopters (operated by the DNA)

The Dominicans will operate out of Peruvian Air Force bases in coordination with their partners. No ground forces are to be committed.

(S)

150 members of the Dominican Rangers will be deployed to Peru, along with the following supporting equipment:

• 6 UH-1 Iroquois Utility Helicopters
• 2 CH-46 Sea Knight Medium Helicopters
• 2 Bristol Beaufighter Strike Aircraft

The following arms are additionally sent to the Free Peruvians:

• 4K Cristobal Carbines
• 5K M1921A1 Thompson SMGs
• 1K 2-inch commando mortars
• 100K .45 and .30 Carbine Rounds

7 October, 1970 - December 31, 1971

Background

The 1960s had been a turbulent period of time for Bolivia which all led into the ascension of General Juan José Torres to the Presidency on the 7th of October, 1970. Though a military man, Torres was a Populist Caudillo who created immediate fears among the establishment. Many worried he might emulate Peruvian President Velasco and these fears were quickly proven correct with his creation of a "people's assembly" to act as a legislative body and restoring the Trotskyist Juan Lechín to chairman of the Central Obrera Boliviana, the countries largest and most powerful union.

Without the prompting of the Americans, the opposition would form a powerful alliance and remove him from power through a coup on the 21st of August, 1971. The ouster would be successful with Hugo Banzer taking up the mantle of the Presidency. Rather than get captured or launch a resistance in Bolivia Torres would seek refuge in Peru under protection of the ideologically aligned Lima government.

The Alliance: Nationalist Popular Front

The Military: Caudillismo/Military Junta

The Bolivian Military since 1964 have been the dominant force within Bolivia which is responsible for much of the instability in the country. Currently anyone with aspirations to control the country require the military's backing if they wish to remain in power for long. Traditionally the military have been a Conservative force in the country though there have been leftist figures like Torres in the organization in the past. Now united under President Hugo Banzer the military are firmly committed to Conservatism and Right-Leaning Authoritarianism. They are outright hostile to far-left Socialism and Communism and seek to keep Soviet influence out of the country by any means possible.

The Revolutionary Nationalist Movement: Social Democracy/Liberalism

Once the MNR were a group of outsiders that many on the right feared would bring Socialism to Bolivia. Though there rhetoric was once "radical" after securing power the MNR would gradually moderate and behave. By the early 1970s the MNR would firmly be in the ideological territory of being a Social Democratic and Liberal Party despite their party name. Because of this they would decide to back Banzer in his coup, fearing the Socialism of Juan José Torres. The most prominent figure within the party remains former President Víctor Paz Estenssoro who held the presidency for much of the 1950s and who would eagerly accept another chance at running the country. The party before moderation took a great deal of inspiration from Peron on foreign policy but during Estenssoro's time as President dicovered the ability to work with the United States. Now they are are the largest faction of Bolivia advocating for cooperation with the West and the United States.

Bolivian Socialist Falanage: Falangism/Third Position/Christian Democracy

The weakest group of the government civic-military alliance, the Bolivian Socialist Falange had struggled extensively during the late 1950s and 1960s. In 1959 party founder Óscar Únzaga would launch a failed coup against MNR President Hernán Siles Zuazo which led to his death. The party ever since has been forced to deal with suppression from all successive governments and a party split with its "leftist" elements into the FSBI. Through this all Mário Gutiérrez has remained party leader. In order to stay relevant throughout the 1960s the party moved towards electoralism, creating an alliance with Christian Democrat movements. Still, it could be argued that more than anything President Banzer's decision to include them in his coalition has saved the party from irrelevancy. Now Mário Gutiérrez has been rewarded with the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, granting his movement a sizable amount of influence over the new government. The movement still cling onto third position stances and overlap with the military in their hostility towards Communism and Socialism. Perhaps this will be the time for their party to experience a full revival and maybe even set themselves up to one day succeed President Banzer.

The Conglomerates: Corporatocracy/Authoritarian Liberalism

In the shadows there is a fourth faction within the Nationalist Popular Front. Much has changed in Bolivia since 1949, the biggest of which is the end of the complete political dominance of the Tin Barons, once a group of some of the wealthiest industrialists in the world who lost all their power following the MNRs revolution. Most of their prosperous mines would go to the newly created public entity, Corporación Minera de Bolivia which by the 1970s has emerged as the largest mining company in the country. Their fear was that President Torres would destroy what little was left for private corporate mining in Bolivia and so they fully backed Banzer's coup. Now the conglomerates hope that the new President will give them an opportunity to regain their old privileges and power over the country with plans to reward him handsomely should he play along. The most notable leader within this group is Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada nicknamed Goni. An influential industrial with a Chicago University background, he has successfully managed Andean Geo-Services Limited and Southern Mining Company COMSUR. Unlike the other industrialists he has long been interested in politics, having joined the MNR in 1951. With the threat of Soviet influence expanding to South America he now feels he may be able to use his influence to uphold stability and make positive changes to improve the struggling GDP of the Republic of Bolivia. Will these industrial magnates manage to regain some of the influence lost from the "glory days" of the Tin Barons?

April 1971 to January 1972

Lima

The Revolutionary Command Council quickly seized power in the aftermath of a counter-coup against General Francisco Morales Bermúdez and his band of rebels. After the flight of the rebel general and close associates to Tacna, Javier Tantaleán Vanini  took control of Lima, the Presidential Palace, and hence government within the capital. Out of all the elected successors of Velasco, Vanini was previously deemed the least likely to follow his general in power. Yet Javier Vanini has proven himself a charismatic, power hungry, and bloodthirsty individual.

Within Velasco's government, Javier Vanini was appointed Minister of the Fisheries. Yet General Javier Vanini, an avid spearfisherman, did not concern himself solely with the matters of his ministry. Javier Vanini led, within Velasco's government, a group of leaders known as "La Misión/The Mision," a corporatist oriented group within The Revolutionary Armed Forces Government.

"La Misión" did not concern itself solely with economic matters; it emphasizes military traditions, order, control of social movements through intelligence services and parallel organizations. These suggestions all being made in an effort to counteract the political left. Yet as Velasco's government grew increasingly closer to the Soviet Union, Javier Vanini found himself sidelined for much of 1970 and early 1971.

The coup by Bermúdez, however, carved a path for Javier Vanini and his followers to seize power over the Revolutionary Armed Forces. The displacement of all other successors named in the case of such a coup allowed Javier Vanini to position himself as the last man standing for Velasco's loyalist forces. Indeed, as he took command of these forces and marched on the Presidential Palace, he found further support amongst the masses of Lima still loyal to Velasco's ideals.

After settling into power, Javier Vanini gave honor to his predecessor. He quickly declared Juan Velasco Alvarado to be a national hero and a martyr of the people, slain by traitors in the final hours of their hold on power. In commitment to his ideals, General Javier Vanini moved to enact revenge on any of Bermúdez's associates and followers unfortunate enough to find themselves in Lima or in areas under his government's control.

The 14th Armored Brigade, principle actors in the Limazo, as Javier Vanini quickly termed the Bermúdez coup, were devastated in ranks and numbers. A firm believer of military traditions and military justice, hundreds of soldiers belonging to the 14th Armored Brigade were set upon by forces loyal to Javier Vanini. Tried in military courts, a large number of officers belonging to the 14th Armored Brigade captured during the rest of April were put to death for insubordinate, dereliction of duty, and treason against the state. Those of the rank and file found themselves expulsed from the army and have become some of the first inmates of internment camps established by the Revolutionary Command Council to contain "anti-revolutionary" elements of society.

May, June, and July would see the establishment of a paramilitary organization known as the "Defenders of the Fatherland/Defensores de la Patria." This paramilitary organization recruits from the ranks of Velasco's loyalists and nationalists. The paramilitary organization quickly takes to the streets of Lima, Pisco, Paracas, Trujillo, and Chiclayo to enforce the government's control alongisde the regular army. Rather then target expressly conservative and rebel elements of Peruvian Society, the paramilitary organization becomes a general blanket which moves to suppress all social and political action against the Revolutionary Command Council, labeling such elements as "anti-Peruvian" and "masonic" in origin. Inevitably, leftist organizations end up caught up in the suppression, which leads to tension within the government itself.

By August, the corporatist influence in Vanini's government begins to grow at an exponential rate. The mining and manufacturing sectors, squarely in the hands of state owned companies, are reorganized into major industry federations. The Peruvian Industrial Association emerges as the largest industrial advisory tool for Vanini's government, which also moves to attempt efforts at the privatization of the manufacturing center. The agricultural and fishery sectors remain largely unaffected by these sudden reforms.

Such actions only serve to bring further tension with the leftist sectors of Vanini's government - but outright infighting within the government is prevented. Javier Vanini falls short of attempting any reform which might contradict his predecessor in the agricultural or mining sectors. The land reforms enacted by Juan Velasco Alvarado remain in place.

The Revolutionary Command Council is also kept unified by the existence of the "Tacna Government" led by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez. During the initial months after the coup, Javier Vanini and the Armed Forces of the Revolutionary Command Council made attempts to quash his "government." Yet the economic blockade enacted by the United States and the Organization of American States coupled with the very limited oil supply available to the Revolutionary Command Council prevented a large scale armoured push agaisnt Tacna and Bermúdez's forces. Similarly, ships and military aircraft remain grounded due to this lack of fuel neccesary to conduct operations.

Instead the Revolutionary Command Council and its loyalist forces are forced to fight the Tacna Government through the use of large infantry formations, mountain artillery, and government aligned militias. From Tacna, to Arequipa, and even to Cusco - the deserts and mountains are dominated by continuous back and forth fighting. Militias and army formations loyal to one side or the other come and go, taking temporary control of a village but never outright settling into place. The fighting here is chaotic and battlelines often change. This, in turn, has displaced hundreds of thousands of the Peruvian peasantry which have fled north, further into Peru, or into Bolivia to escape the fighting.

The destruction of villages and organized village life has left farms empty and crops rotting in the fields. By the end of 1971, signs of regional famine have begun to emerge. Food prices have quickly risen in the southern departments of Peru, families go hungry for longer periods of time and their ranks begin to swell, and fields collapse from lack of care by their owners.

On the coast, a concurrent disaster has begun to develop. The start of 1972 has brought smaller catches of anchovetas. Declining catches and stocks has triggered a sharp increase in anchoveta prices. The Revolutionary Command Council has taken notice - with preparations for nationalization of the fishing industry silently being drawn up.

The Revolutionary Command Council and Javier Vanini face a grim situation - albeit not a completely hopeless one. Their government holds firm command of the north and center of the nation, while also controlling large swathes of the south. Much of the rural countryside rallies behind them in the central and southern departments - with the peasantry, mestizo and indigenous alike, forming local militias (which in turn are armed by the government) to defend their family farms and thereby assist the government.

Even with the events before and after the coup, the promise and guarantee of full ownership of their lands and stubborn pride have led large swathes of the peasantry and population to linger on behind the Revolutionary Command Council. Yet this unity may prove fragile as Javier Vanini plots a path for Peru free of socialist dominance, which he privately blames for the civil war.

Tacna, April 1971 to January 1971

After fleeing Lima, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez organized his own loyal forces: anti-communist fighters, conservative landowners, catholic clergy, and proclaimed patriots seeking to throw off Soviet dominance within the country.

Tacna has become the home of his government. Military officers, onservative businesses, and catholic priests have quickly filled the ministries of his government. His arrival and those of thousands of men and allies cemented his firm hold over the city. Tacna, in turn, became a demonstration of his intentions for the rest of Peru.

While initially proclaiming himself and his coup as a self corrective event meant to reel back the excesses of the revolution, Bermúdez dropped all pretenses of remaining loyal to Velasco's vision by the end of April. Tacna, a focal regional center for copper mining, would see a wave of privatization. Copper mines in the City of Tacna and across the department are privatized and sold to the highest bidders as a way to earn cash. Some of these copper mines fall into the hands of the Government of the Dominican Republic, as a gift for the assistance offered by Santo Domingo in resisting the leftist traitors. Per Bermúdez's words.

Tacna and the Tacna Department, producing 50% of the nation's olives, also see land redistribution - in favor of the previous owners. Landowners find their lands returned by local government decree. Albeit such efforts do not come without resistance. Tacna, home to around 92,000 individuals, sees fighting almost immediately. Local militias, previously established by the Velasco Government, begin organizing as the Tacna peasantry attempts to resist these decrees. The department becomes a zone of bloodbath - but Bermúdez ultimately enforces these "reforms" through force of arms and the skill of his own men. Albeit such fighting continues sporadically throughout the year.

The department's artisanal fishing industry remains untouched - earning Bermúdez the respect and love of fishermen across the south.

By May, Bermúdez's forces had fully reorganized in Tacna and quickly began an offensive north. The Cities of Llo and Matarani quickly fell to Bermúdez's forces - who often proved themselves more enthusiastic, with higher morale, and fiercer then the local garrisons left by the Revolutionary Command Council to guard these southern cities. The local Peruvian populations, whose livelihoods had been greatly disrupted by the nationalization of the copper mining industry and by the collapse of international trade with Peru respectively, welcomed Bermúdez's forces as heroes.

This wave of success continued onwards into Arequipa, which fell to Bermúdez forces at the end of May. The city, home to a population of 370,000 people, welcomed the Tacna Government and its military with open arms. Arequipa, home to a large middle class and emerging national borgouise, sees the population largely rally behind Francisco Morales Bermúdez - whom they view as their only hope in throwing off the socialist regime in Lima. As the second largest metropolitan area behind Lima, the Fall of Arequipa should have proven the jumpstart for a quick recapture of the country.

Alas, it was not meant to be.

After Arequipa, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez may have perhaps made the most disastrous decision of his campaign. Believing the Revolutionary Command Council incapable of properly responding to his actions and viewing their forces as too disorganized to offer proper resistance, Bermúdez split his own smaller but relatively trained force in two, confident both would meet their objectives. The first force marched towards Puno, taking the major roads there with the aim of swinging north to Cuzco.

His secondary group swung along the coast, marching directly for Nazca with the eventual aim of opening the road to Lima. Both were destined to fail.

While Puno fell in quick succession and those forces marched on Cusco, supply shortages and the rapid rise of Quecha and Aymara militias brought heavy casualties to Bermúdez's forces in the area. His forces marched to the outskirts of Cusco, but the city, home the 6th Army Division, the most ideologically committed of the Revolutionary Command Council forces, fought bitterly and resisted any attempts to push into the city. Che Guevara, famous revolutionary leader and fighter, was killed in the clashes. Ultimately, however, sheer numbers from all directions would force this group back - with even Puno being retaken by Quecha militias at the end of November.

The second group, which continued its march across the coast, faced a wall of men and artillery outside of Nazca. Bermúdez's forces, not much better equipped and lacking in air and armoured support, were slaughtered by the hundreds while attempting to shatter the hastily organized defenses around the city. The heavy fighting here also forced the Tacna Government back.

The Tacna Government maintains firm hold over the departments of Tacna and Moquegua. It controls a large portion of the Arequipa department, including Peru's second largest city, and it conducts regular operations agaisnt pro government villages and indigenous militias in the Puno, Cusco, Apurimac, Ayacucho, and Ica departments. Yet in comparison to the Revolutionary Command Council, the land and population it firmly controls is much more limited.

The Tacna Government survives due to Lima's lack of fuel, which prevents it from organizing an offensive capable of crushing Bermúdez. Soviet fighter craft and tanks sit within their armories, unused due to this lack of fuel. Yet the Tacna Government is unable to deliver a finishing blow of its own. True, it receives new volunteers everyday from defecting soldiers, conservative farmers, landowners, and all manners of nationalistic middle class borgouise seeking to crush the socialist spider in Lima. Yet in sheer numbers of armed supporters it lags desperately behind the Lima government.

Perhaps its greatest saving grace is the flow of outside assistance - mainly from the Dominican Republic. This access to the sea and outside help allows the Tacna Government to sustain the fighting across Southern Peru even if it lacks the ability to push to Lima.

Yet Bermúdez, while tightly in control, is not completely without detractors. Aside from the on and off clashes with Quecha militias around his territory, Bermúdez also contests with protests against his military rule from politicians of the Christian Democratic Party and their more liberal minded peers in Arequipa, who urge him to establish a civilian government capable of rallying the undecided majority of Peruvians to the cause of democracy.

These protests are often suppressed through rifles and bullets, but the tensions are present.

Summary

1972 sees the rise of a new year in Peru. A devastating year. A year of constant clashes and struggle. Neighbors turn against neighbors and the fields of Southern Peru are filled with the bodies of the fallen strewn amidst burning villages. An international crisis continues to unfold as both sides bitterly struggle on, refusing to concede to an enemy that has come to, in their eyes, encompass every ill of the country they both tear to pieces in equal term.

January 4, 1972

After months of grueling training for the enlisted recruits, basic training was finally over. The soldiers of the new Mauritanian army had spent much of 1972 learning how to become a rifleman, take orders, and were instilled with a patriotism and hope for their country. Both white and black faces dotted the graduation ceremony as the UN had created and envisioned this military as fully integrated to help combat Mauritanian racial issues - while the broader part of Mauritanian society would need more work to overcome such issues, the small military being a fraction of that society was much easier to instill a feeling of unity and camaraderie.

The officer class had been learning alongside them, and even starting their training before their enlisted compatriots. After all, they had to learn their own basics from the UN trainers before they learned to lead men of their own. The officer class had been created with a very western-leaning, democratic, and. UN-sympathetic attitude encouraged by the Swedish, Irish, and Ghanaian trainers that mostly made up the UN force in the country, as well as taking some of those positions from the French advisers sent to deliver and assist with training for the small military’s equipment.

For the UNTAM, the graduation ceremony and represented a huge milestone for Mauritania to move towards a nation state that could run itself. To have internal security prevalent once again would ensure that the state being built could operate more effectively - and, indeed, positive reports from the new police academy were also being sent to UNTAM, with some of those officers being sent to their postings.

Of course, this was a small step. There was no navy, no air force, no armor, and limited support equipment. The ability of the fledgling state to maintain more than the few thousand troops they had recruited was stretched to its maximum, and that capacity to expand would need to be built over years. But for now, this small force and the police to supplement it would have to do.

Surely Mauritania was less at risk for violence?

——————-

META: a new; but small, pro-UN/west-leaning Mauritanian military is trained and at barracks near Kiffa. New police forces are being sent to the cities.