I kept thinking about the interview Alexander Kupnyi did with Alexey Fatakhov (former Senior Reactor Control Engineer at Chernobyl) and how valuable to me was information I learned from him. Specifically, about ORM, what it exists for, and what were the operators allowed to do with it.
The interview is in Russian, with no subtitles available (sadly), so I decided to translate (and paraphrase) some part of it, hopefully you find it interesting. Link to the interview - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ZJVnvhgFIc
For convenience, I'll mark Kupnyi as "K", and Fatakhov as "F". Operational regulations are called the "reglament" in Russian, so I'll use that word, as well.
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F - The reglament did not forbid operating the reactor at 200 MW thermal. Different matter is that it was a bad power level. And they knew this.
K - What is your take on what happened in the control room, step by step?
F - A lot of witness accounts, and in the comission report, they say that Dyatlov forced Toptunov to raise the power. I think that the situation was somewhat different. He didn't force him, he told him off for being unable to raise the power on his own, due to lack of experience. As per Tregub's (previous shift supervisor) memories, Tregub stepped up to help and, along with Akimov and Tptunov, they managed to raise the power. Although, according to Dyatlov, he saw that power was already being raised when he got back to the control room from his walkabout. Raising the power was not against the then-existing rules. It was complicated, though.
K - How did they raise the power?
F - By withdrawing control rods, naturally.
K - About the rods. What do the rules say, about the minimum number of control rods?
F - The concept of Operational Reactivity Margin, measured in control rods, as well as the concept of a Xenon pit, is described in the RBMK handbook, written by its constructors. It talks about how, when there's a change in power level, reactivity drops, and in order to compensate for this drop, there needs to be an amount of "spare reactivity" available, before power level change is executed. And then, this spare reactivity can be spent, all the way. By withdrawing all of the control rods, so that the reactor could be kept running at the desired power level, until Xenon poisoning levels out. This concept of [reactivity] margin is there so that it could be used, when needed.
Before the accident at Leningrad NPP in 1975, everyone considered ORM simply as this spare reactivity needed for times when there's a threat of a Xenon pit.
K - So, prior to that even in 1975, it was considered perfectly normal to withdraw all of the control rods.
F - Yes, and that's exactly what they did when there was a power drop - they withdrew all of the control rods. Power started rising rapidly, and that's when positive void coefficient came into play. A fuel channel or two ruptured, also damaging channels around them. They narrowly avoided a major disaster. There was an investigation, the causes were established, and a program was developed to fix this issue. But it was slow, and in these 10 years, it didn't get to Chernobyl Unit 4 in time. And the findings about the cause of the acident were classified, and were not communicated to the operators at CNPP.
That's when the rule about "15 control rods minimum" was introduced. But this parameter was not considered as fast-changing. It was for nominal power level, and whenever a fuel rod was spent and needed changing, ORM would fall below miminum (could be taken all the way down to 0), until that rod was swapped with a fresh one, upon which ORM would go back to normal. After the disaster, a new rule was made to keep ORM at 26 - 30 rods, and in emergency situations, 15.
But, there was no indicator in the control room that would show the current ORM value, when there were fast changes in reactor parameters that could affect ORM. Not just fuel burnup, but also feed water temperature, pressure, etc. There were no instruments to reflect ORM during such fast changes.
When Unit 4 operator raised the power to 200MW, all they had was an ORM printout, made half an hour ago by the SKALA computer, showing ORM of 19 rods - within the acceptable limits.
About 10 seconds before AZ-5 was pressed, ORM returned to its normal value of 15 rods.